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1 
Introduction 
 
How to manage trade in public services and utilities in a globalising world? As part of this larger 
question, this essay will look at an increasingly important aspect of managing trade, namely the 
area of privatised public services and the corresponding growth of so-called “public services 
TNCs”. More precisely, the essay will take the water industry as a paradigmatic case for such 
emerging challenges to managing global trade.  
 
In a first section, we will thus introduce the context of globalisation increasingly leading to liber-
alisation and the delegation of public services and utilities to the private sector in favour of large 
TNCs operating in such field. Interest for this challenging process is to be found in the ensuing 
imbalance between the proposed aim to accomplish an economic activity in the public good and 
the conflicting conduct of private operators utterly dictated by market rules and profit seeking 
considerations. 
 
In the second section, we will develop the above subject, with reference to water supply and 
sewerage and the conduct of major TNCs in this critical sector of world trade. In particular, ten-
dency to concentration through horizontal and vertical integration, restrictive practices to com-
petition and abuse of corporate power will be presented as determinants of restricted and dis-
criminatory access to water as well as reasons for regulating corporate misconduct. 
 
In the third section, the existing regulatory framework in which large water TNCs operate at na-
tional and international level will be examined. As for national regulation, the two paradigmatic 
cases of the French and British systems, both inspired by the neo-liberal doctrine, will be criti-
cised in their theoretical and practical functioning. Relevant international rules treating TNCs’ 
conduct and international competition in public procurement will also be considered, altogether 
with the crucial issue of product and production standards in the water industry.     
 
In the fourth and final section, all considerations previously raised will be summed up in pro-
posed alternative policies to the prevailing neo-liberal approach in operating water utilities. All 
proposed policies will address both TNCs and public enterprises and their relative roles, in the 
attempt to indicate innovative solutions oriented to sustainable development and a “level playing 
field” for suppliers and consumers.   
1. The context : globalisation, privatisation of public utilities and TNCs’ growth 
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1. The context: globalisation, privatisation of public utilities 
and TNCs’ growth 
 
Since their relatively recent appearance, widely recognised as taking place in the second half of 
the nineteenth century, modern transnational corporations (TNCs) have fostered the interna-
tional division of production (Muchlinski, 1995: 19-33). Comparative advantages assured by the 
production and distribution of factor inputs and finished goods on a global scale are said to be 
the main reason for the success of TNCs (Salvatore, 1992: 464-466; Pottier, 1991: 61-63), 
which have hence indissolubly linked their fortune to the consolidation and expansion of global-
isation1. 
 
Globalisation is characterised by an extremely high, continuously growing degree of interde-
pendence among national economies. Two fundamental indicators of one country’s involvement 
in the global economic system are the scope and extent to which this country tends to rely on 
inward/outward foreign direct investment (FDI) and the depth of integration with other econo-
mies. Globalisation thus appear to be accompanied by the graual though unstoppable elimina-
tion of boundaries to local, national markets becoming increasingly integrated. 
 
The latter process appears to be driven by large TNCs, whose strategies pursue higher degrees 
of efficiency in response to mounting competition and increasingly lead to the integration of 
markets in consequence of growing flows of production factors across national boundaries 
(UNCTAD, 1994: 117-146; OECD, 1994b: 3-5). In this regard, after the increase in FDI regis-
tered in the 1980s, respectively from 1979 to 1981 and from 1986 to 1990, a new dramatic rise 
is being currently witnessed with record inflows totalling US$ 349 billion in 1996, corresponding 
to a 10 percent growth in relation to the preceding year. As a result, the stock of  FDI amounted 
to some US$ 3.1 trillion in 1996, as compared to US$ 2 trillion in 1993 and US$ 1 trillion in 1987 
(UNCTAD, 1997: 3-28)2. Expansion strategies of leading TNCs in the light of the perceived in-
                                                          
1  To this extent, it is significant that executives of the leading industrial TNCs perceive their firm's degree of 
transnationality as the source of a substantial part of the enjoyed competitive advantages (Dunning, 1996). On 
the nature of globalisation, see OECD (1994b); UNCTAD (1994: 117-160). 
2  In particular, FDI flows are to be distinguished between inflows and outflows, the latter accounting for US$ 
347 billion in 1996 due to a 2 percent increase. The difference between FDI inflows and outflows can be ex-
plained with the reinvestment of profits and revenues generated by FDI, which are calculated as inflows. It 
should also be noted that from 1982 to 1994 FDI stock grew twofold as a percentage of global GDP (Gross 
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ternational economic conditions constitute the principal determinant for this upcoming surge in 
the transfer of productive resources to foreign markets (UNCTAD, 1996a: 36-37)3. A demon-
stration of the highlighted trend lies on the fact that FDI is mainly emanating from large TNCs4, 
not to consider other forms of capital allocation in international markets such as portfolio in-
vestment5. Another indicator of the aggressive expansion of TNCs is given by the fact that sales 
and assets owned by such firms are growing more rapidly than world GDP, so that significant 
shares of global wealth will predictably be more and more concentrated in the hands of transna-
tionally organised enterprises, namely the largest TNCs.  
 
This also suggests that TNCs are imposing themselves as the prevailing model of corporate 
structure, being adopted by a growing number of undertakings based in developing and transi-
tional countries under the encouragement of the attained performance (UNCTAD, 1997: 3-28)6. 
Yet, the “transnational corporate” model is more and more affecting the organisational structure 
and the behaviour of publicly owned enterprises, respectively turning to “corporatisation” as well 
as to the internationalisation of their activities so as to achieve enhanced competitiveness (Hall, 
1998a: 67-68, 75-77). The above outcomes can indeed be explained by referring to two major 
components of the globalisation process. First, in a globalising world, the marketplace tends to 
be accepted as the most efficient allocator of all kinds of resources irrespective of their private 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Domestic Product), while in 1996 the increase in FDI inflows was superior to the 6.6 percent rise in the nomi-
nal value of the world GDP as well as to the 4.5 percent rise in international trade. 
3  A few observations are necessary in order to assess the scope of FDI in the overall process of growing global 
trade. FDI can be considered as a substitute for, or a complement to, arm’s length trade. In a protectionist 
world, transplants allows the elusion of trade barriers such as tariffs and quotas on imported goods while, in a 
liberalised world, FDI facilitates control of a given market thanks to an easier adaptation to consumer prefer-
ences and a close location to consumers. Being the world not fully protectionist nor liberalised, firms’ deci-
sions on whether to resort to FDI or arm’s length trade are commonly taken after the evaluation of costs and 
benefits related to the two options, including also transport costs of traded goods. For a comprehensive anal-
ysis of the present interlinkages between FDI and trade, see UNCTAD (1996: 73-93).            
4  “The world’s largest 100 TNCs (not including those in banking and finance) ... are estimated to account for 
about one-third of the combined outward FDI of their countries of origin”, where the countries in question are 
all developed (UNCTAD, 1994: 3-9). 
5   As far as the financing of economic development is concerned, in recent years funds from financial markets to 
private sector investments exceeded public sources of capital. Transfers of private capital are now estimated 
to represent four-fifths of the total flows of resources to developing and transitional economies (MIGA, 1997: 
12). 
6  TNCs operating worldwide are approximately 44,000 with some 280,000 foreign affiliates. On the increasingly 
important role played by TNCs originated in developing countries, see UNCTAD (1997: 28-38), (1996: 29-36). 
On the emergence of TNCs in newly industrialised countries, see Muchlinski (1995: 28-32).   
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 or public ownership. Second, in a globalising world, the market tends to be the world itself. The 
pervading presence of TNCs in today’s economy is therefore producing an acceleration in the 
restructuring of the penetrated industries and markets as well as in the change of the competi-
tors’ behaviour.  
 
1.1. Preliminary definitions and clarifications 
 
Before proceeding to observe the impact of globalisation on a number of economic sectors tra-
ditionally reserved to the intervention of the public hand and the consequent restructuring of 
those industries, some preliminary definitions and clarifications may be necessary. These will 
regard the economic and institutional processes deriving from or related to the apparently un-
stoppable path of globalisation, the main actors involved in the entailing changes and their fields 
of operation.  
 
One of the foremost features of globalisation, liberalisation of international economic transac-
tions consists of the progressive removal by governments of regulatory barriers to the free 
transfer of resources and thus to market access (UNCTAD, 1994: 279-312; OECD, 1994b: 4-7). 
A comparable though more specific concept, deregulation is conceived as the abatement by na-
tional or supranational governmental authorities of rules and monitoring programmes apt to 
control the conduct of all subjects active in a definite industry (Paddon, 1998: 60). The growing 
importance of the supranational origin of deregulation is clearly demonstrated by the example of 
the European Union (EU) imposing to member governments the deregulation of key sectors, 
such as telecommunications and predictably electricity, within the internal market. For the pur-
poses of this essay, we define privatisation as the complete or partial transfer to the private 
sector of ownership of or control over publicly owned enterprises or assets, after payment of a 
price or other forms of compensation. This notion encompasses the involvement of private ac-
tors in the contracting out of public services through concession or licensing agreements as well 
as contractual relationships falling within the category of BOT (Build, Operate and Transfer) 
agreements (Sader, 1995: 2)7. It is hence intended that the “corporatisation” of public enterpris-
                                                          
7 Under BOT agreements, the concession to construct and operate a public infrastructure or utility is awarded to 
a private company, the project company, for a long-term period. The concession period is calculated so as to 
allow the investor to achieve full cost recovery for the construction and operation of the facilities, for the fi-
nancing of the project as well as a return on the basis of the agreed percentage. At the end of the concession 
period, the project company transfers the operated infrastructure or utility to the local government, so that the 
cycle – build, operate and transfer – is complete. According to the introduction of varying elements, the BOT 
framework can change in BLOT (Build, Lease, Operate and Transfer), BOO (Build, Own, Operate) and TOT 
1.  The context: globalisation, privatisation of public utilities and TNCs’ growth 
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es, namely the change of legal status from administrative department to independent company, 
does not necessarily correspond to the transfer of ownership to private subjects, albeit it often 
precedes privatisation (Hall, 1998a: 67-68)8.  
 
As for the main actors in the scenario of globalisation, a TNC is defined as a company owning 
or controlling production, services or facilities in at least two countries. It is intended that we will 
mainly refer to TNCs as to the so-called “public service TNCs”, or those large TNC offering pub-
lic services and utilities to local communities. Due to their increasing participation to internation-
al trade, public enterprises will also be considered. In its more updated conception, a public en-
terprise is “broadly defined as including any undertaking which has its own accounts, has in-
come derived from services provided (unlike defence, tax collection, social security), and is 
owned wholly or partly by central, regional or local government” (Hall, 1998a: 63).  
 
The activities performed by private and public enterprises herein taken into account coincide 
with the provision of a series of public services and utilities generally related to as network or in-
frastructural services. Those sectors include electricity and gas, telecommunications, ports and 
airports, transport, postal services, waste management, to end with water supply and sanitation. 
However, it should be noted that the list is not exhaustive of all public services in which public 
and private operators are jointly involved, as other relevant areas as health care are not com-
prised. Public utilities are recognised to cover an essential function not only for the economy, 
but also for the whole society, so to be considered of general interest. In a recent Communica-
tion, the EU Commission has asserted that such services “play an important role as social ce-
ment over and above practical considerations ... This implies certain basic operating principles: 
continuity, equal access, universality and openness”9. While the first three operating principles 
appear as preconditions to the public purpose of the provived services, openness seems to ad-
dress operators in order to allow the maximum efficiency and effectiveness of the overall indus-
try. In fact, the low contestability of the market is a matter of concern over natural monopoly and 
the ensuing social costs due to the monopolistic behaviour of  public utility operators. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(Transfer Of a Transfer) agreements. For the practice of BOT agreements and such other instruments func-
tional to the private financing of infrastructure, see IFC, 1994.  
8  For a different view, see Paddon (1998: 59-60). 
9  Communication from the EU Commission: Services of general interest (Brussels, Commission of the Europe-
an Union, 11 Sep. 1996), p. 3. As cited in De Luca, L. (1998)  Labour and social dimensions of privatization 
and restructuring (public utilities:water, gas, electricity), Geneva (Published for the International Labour Or-
ganization), vii.  
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 Finally, market contestability is the openness of a given market or the degree of entry for 
emerging competitors and exit for undertakings already operating in the market concerned. 
The ongoing liberalisation of FDIs is generally believed to foster the contestability of markets 
entered and to thus increase competition, unless entering TNCs exercise their market and cor-
porate power in the form of restrictive practices (UNCTAD, 1997: 133-163). In most public utili-
ties, the low contestability of the market, grounded on high barriers to entry in terms of start-up 
capital, critical firm dimensions and developed technology, furthered by horizontal consolidation 
of incumbent undertakings, notably reduces incentives to competition while granting perspec-
tively enduring oligopoly positions at international level. Tendency to extremely low contestabil-
ity is a cause of natural monopoly market structure, given by under-additive cost functions im-
plying that the cost of the factors used in the production cycle are minimised when only one en-
terprise is operating in the market (Plane, 1998: 38). Both low market contestability and natural 
monopoly justify public intervention, as they prove to be a threat of monopolistic or quasi- mo-
nopolistic behaviour resulting in excessive pricing, extra profits, low quality of or limited access 
to the service provided.  
 
1.2.  The stream of public utility privatisations and its sources 
 
Policies reflecting the trend towards enhanced liberalisation and aimed to face mounting public 
debt burdens have inspired the massive privatisation of state owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
other publicly owned enterprises, i.e. municipal, at universal level. In this sense, partial or com-
plete divestiture of public enterprises is the most visible manifestation of the contemporary crisis 
affecting the state and its role in assuring continuous, equal and universal services to the citi-
zenship. Since the early 1980s, this has occurred with different timing and dynamics in devel-
oped10 as well as developing countries and, after the collapse of the socialist bloc together with 
the model of command economy, also in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries11. Alt-
hough the determinants of such a shift in public policies may vary from developed to developing 
and transitional countries, budgetary limitations are closely related to the ideological and politi-
cal pressures exerted on decision-makers.  
 
                                                          
10  In particular, the surge in the privatisation of public services and utilities has begun in some developed coun-
tries traditionally favourable to market, such as the USA, the UK and New Zealand.  
11  For the purposes of this essay, we consider CEE countries as all the borrowing members of the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development.  
1.  The context: globalisation, privatisation of public utilities and TNCs’ growth 
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In general, financial constraints have modified public expenditures in nature and extent, often 
leading to underinvestment which paved the way to the delegation of public utilities to the pri-
vate sector, in the search of efficient management. In developed countries, the fall of public 
spending results of endeavours and commitments to produce a more internationally competitive 
environment. A clear example of this are the convergence criteria required to be met by the 
Maastricht Treaty as a precondition to the European Monetary Union (EMU). On the other hand, 
in most developing and transitional countries, the curb on interventionist  policies primarily de-
rives from the urge to contain intolerable external debt or deficit (Plane, 1998:12-13; Saravia, 
1998: 177-179). Moreover, in the absence of alternative incomes, revenues generated from in-
frastructure divestiture are functional to restore public finances, thus explaining the significant 
extension of private sector involvement in the operation of public utilities among developing 
countries. Because of the serious debt crisis reaching its peak from 1982 and 1984 and the 
controversial implications in the official development assistance (ODA)12, the dearth of financial 
resources impelled those latter countries to considerably intensify the efforts to attract foreign 
investments through the adoption of permissive legislation. So that in 1992 the overall amount 
from public enterprises and assets divestiture exceeded that in developed countries for the first 
time (UNCTAD, 1994: 24-26)13.  
  
Choices for privatisation of public utilities are thus respondent to financial limitations to public 
action, but cannot be entirely explained without contemplating the ideological and political 
pressures abundantly exerted by some national governments, international financial institutions 
and lobbies representing the principal beneficiaries of this massive transfer of resources, name-
ly the largest TNCs. Since the election of Ronald Reagan and Margareth Tatcher respectively 
as President of the USA and Prime Minister of the UK, those two countries have unceasingly 
promoted the idea of a reduced public role in the economy in favour of private capital (Saravia, 
1998: 177-179). The prospective outcomes of the exported neo-liberal pattern are patent when 
considered the situation of the UK, with its relative lack of public enterprises due to legislation 
discouraging municipal enterprises and large scale privatisation programmes. In particular, the 
restrictive provisions of the PSBR to the borrowing of publicly owned enterprises happen to be a 
major restraint to make the necessary investment, thus encouraging privatisation as the only 
solution to the lack of public finance (Hall, 1998a: 77-78)14. 
                                                          
12  On the debt crisis and ODA respectively, see HOGENDORN (1990: 188-224; 149-158). While FDI inflows to 
developing countries and transitional economies increased from US$ 25 billion in 1990 to US$ 100 billion in 
1996, in the same period ODA ranged between US$ 40 and 50 billion per year (MIGA, 1997: 12).  
13  The total sales volume from privatisations from 1988 to 1992 amounts to US$ 185 billion.  
14  This seems to be particularly the case of London Underground, as compared to public enterprises in EU 
1. The context : globalisation, privatisation of public utilities and TNCs’ growth 
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As for telecommunications, subsequent to the introduction of domestic market deregulation, 
the US government devoted generous efforts to influence its counterparts in the course of nego-
tiations and debates taking place within multilateral frameworks as the International Telecom-
munications Union (ITU) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Supple-
mentary strains came from TNCs, organised in the so called “user communities” to augment the 
respective bargaining power in order to obtain enlarged business opportunities, with the pur-
pose of expanding economies of scale and consolidating market control by means of the de-
veloped technology. As a result, an increasing number of developed and developing countries 
are adopting liberalisation policies leading to the privatisation of national telecommunication util-
ities, thus widening the playing field for major private operators (Martin, 1993: 106-114). While 
the UK privatised in the early 1980s, the other member states of the European Community al-
together with Switzerland and Norway have deregulated the sector in question since 1 January 
1998. Again, in other sectors as electricity, inducement to open up is to mainly ascribe to US ini-
tiatives, at bilateral level through the action of the United States Agency for International Devel-
opment (USAID) and within international forums such as the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC)15. Moreover, both the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have impelled outnumbered developing 
countries to adopt privatisation measures by means of Structural Adjustment Programmes im-
posing cost cutting in government (PSRC, 1996: 5-9). 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
countries. The author stresses that the convergence criteria set in the Maastricht Treaty are only constraining 
general government financial deficit, with the exclusion of commercial operations. So that public enterprises 
resorting to financial markets to finance investments are subjected to the same conditions as private under-
takings. See also Hall (1998b: 130-131). 
15  APEC member countries are 18: Australia; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; Chile; People’s Republic of China; 
Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Papua New Guin-
ea; the Philippines; Singapore; Chinese Taipei; the USA.  
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Table 1. Infrastructure privatisations in developing countries, 1988-1995 
(Millions of US dollars and percentage) 
Industry Total revenues Foreign investment Foreign investment as a share of 
total revenues 
 
Utilities 
Power/gas/electricity 
Water and sanitation 
 
11,130 
10,903 
227 
 
3,994 
3,905 
89 
 
35.9 
35.9 
39.4 
 
Telecommunications 
 
21,293 
 
14,253 
 
66.9 
 
Transport 
Airlines 
Railroads 
Road transportation 
Ports and shipping 
 
7,518 
6,106 
453 
431 
528 
 
2,178 
1,739 
99 
64 
276 
 
29.0 
28.5 
21.8 
14.8 
52.3 
 
Total 
 
39,941 
 
20,425 
 
51.1 
 
Source: UNCTAD (1996a: 25) from the World Bank, privatisation database. 
Note: Preliminary estimates. 
 
Accordingly, TNCs have benefited from augmented opportunities to expand their activities, not 
only due to the extension of existing markets but also for the opening of sectors previously be-
lieved to represent public natural monopolies, which therefore tended to exclusively fall within 
the competence of public enterprises16. The above statement holds particularly true for public 
services and utilities whose critical importance for the national welfare had long induced central 
governments to protect publicly owned or controlled operators against private competition. In 
order to perceive the volume of the business in question, it should be noted that approximately 
one fifth of capital formation in OECD countries happens to be in infrastructure (OECD, 1994a: 
3)17. Furthermore, table 1 above shows that revenues generated from infrastructure privatisa-
                                                          
16  As for such industries as oil, air transport, telecommunications and utilities, in 1994 the scheduled sale of 
SOEs in Western European countries only was estimated as generate the transfer of US$ 150 billion to the 
private sector by 1998 (UNCTAD, 1994: 24-26).   
17  The Organisation for the Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is a regional organisation, whose 
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 tions in developing countries from 1988 to 1995 amount to some US$ 40 billion, variably dis-
tributed among public utilities, including power, gas and electricity as well as water and sanita-
tion, and other public services such as telecommunications and transport (UNCTAD, 1996a: 
25)18. 
 
Privatisation of public services and utilities proves to be a lucrative business especially for 
TNCs, as it is indicated by figures and shares of foreign investors’ participation to public enter-
prises’ divestiture19. This is not only due to the acquisition of extremely rentable positions after 
payment of a one-off price, but also to the initiatives introduced by governments in order to at-
tract potential private investors. For instance, the price paid for French, UK and Spanish water 
utilities has been estimated as inferior to the market value. In addition, previous to the privatisa-
tion of public enterprises, the British government has repeatedly followed the practice to annul 
significant shares of the suffered debt (Hall, 1998b: 130). Similar findings suggest that privatisa-
tion implies a substantial transfer of resources from the public to private operators and induce to 
concentrate on the resulting industrial restructuring and the consequences for the public inter-
est. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
main purpose is to promote the principle of market economy. The 26 member countries are Canada, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, the UK and the USA. 
18  Several indicators show the current trend in increased volumes of business from the contracting out of public 
services and utilities. First, revenues generated from public utility sales in developing countries from 1988 to 
1993 accounted for US$ 32 billion, corresponding to one third of total revenues from privatisation pro-
grammes. In detail, US$ 15.5 billion sales were in telecommunications, US$ 9.6 billion related to energy sup-
ply, while sales of national airlines alone were worth US$ 5.4 billion. In a regional perspective, a remarkably 
intensive activity of governmental authorities in privatising SOEs providing public services is to be noticed in 
Latin America & Caribbean and in East Asia & Pacific. Infrastrucure divestment in those areas generated 
nearly 50% of all revenues from privatisations, respectively totalling US$ 55.2 billion and US$ 16.2 billion 
(Sader, 1995: 9-11). Second, as far as the coverage of political risks affecting FDI in developing countries is 
concerned, the share of infrastructure in MIGA’s portfolio by industry has grown from 4 per cent in fiscal year 
1994 to 17 per cent in 1997 (MIGA, 1997:  18; 1996: 16).   
19  On the lucrative aspect of privatisations, see Martin (1993: 95-105).  
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1.3.  International restructuring of public utilities, repercussions 
and related concerns 
 
Entry of large TNCs in the provision of public services has led to a considerable restructuring of 
the respective industries, generally attributable to different approaches adopted in the operation 
of utilities20. Industrial restructuring is made possible by technological innovations restricting the 
scope for the traditional natural monopolies, according to the neo-liberal belief of unique effi-
ciency gains due to international competition. However, the “revolutionary” conduct of private 
corporations in the management and provision of public services and utilities has not only af-
fected the structure and functioning of the respective industries, but also the behaviour of pub-
licly owned competitors and their attitude towards their public and social mandate. As previously 
stated, the reason for public natural monopolies in public services and utilities can be identified 
in the non contestability of market, in the strategic importance of the industry for the whole soci-
ety as well as in the public ownership of input resources and/or infrastructure in the core pro-
duction cycle. Conversely, technological and organisational innovations introduced in the 1980s 
have modified under-additive cost functions in many sectors of operations, so to maximise the 
efficiency of the overall industry in presence of more than one enterprise competing internation-
ally (Plane, 1998: 13-14). In particular, the neo-liberal doctrine has stressed the potential ad-
vantages of full liberalisation and pricing at cost for producers and operators as well as for con-
sumers, benefiting from cheaper and higher standard services provided in entirely flexible mar-
kets. Table 2 displays the structure of some utility industries as emerging from the above men-
tioned innovations. 
 
Table 2. Structure of utility industries 
Sector Infrastructure 
(natural monopoly) 
Production/services 
(open to competition) 
Electricity Interconnection and distribution Power stations 
Gas Gas pipelines and distribution Gas wells 
Water Distribution and sewerage Water treatment 
Railways Rails Trains and transport services 
Air transport Airports and airspace Aircraft and transport services 
Telecommunications Cables, satellites, frequencies Value-added services 
Source: Plane (1998: 14) as reproduced from Bouttes and Haag (1993). 
                                                          
20   For a summary of the forces and considerations leading to the process of infrastructure restructuring, 
see Conklin and Lecraw, 1997: 1-30). 
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 However, technological and organisational changes represent only a partial explanation of the 
undergone restructuring, if not considered the commercial motivations driving public service 
TNCs.  Unlike public enterprises, private companies participating to the globalisation process 
determine market fragmentation in that, while seeking scale economy dimensions, they also 
move towards enhanced specialisation so as to control specific market segments (Pottier, 1991: 
61-63). For instance, in the gas and electricity sector there is an evident shift to separating ac-
tivities related to energy generation, transmission and distribution, although the disposal of elec-
tricity grids or gas pipeline networks by SOEs was commonly deemed as creating natural mo-
nopolies (Hemming and Mansoor, 1988: 14-15)21. A comparable case is offered by the British 
and Swedish railway system, where ownership and operation were split subsequent to privatisa-
tion. Similarly, the fragmentation of a sector, such as for example the postal service market, al-
lows competitors, such as DHL and FedEx, to seek out highly specific segments, allowing them 
to establish themselves in extremely profitable niches.  
 
Unbundling, as the separation of the various activities carries out by the divested public enter-
prises is called, is generally a step that precedes privatisation. This aims to reduce the proposed 
price of the operating units to be transferred to the private sector, as even the largest corpora-
tions or consortia seldom dispose of the necessary means to the whole purchase of major pub-
lic enterprises, especially if SOEs, or cannot afford to bear the related financial risks22. On the 
other hand, separate auctions for the unbundled undertakings allow owning authorities to in-
crease the aggregate revenues obtained from the divestiture of public enterprises, so that un-
bundling can also be functional to alleviate public debt or budget deficit as the case might be.  
 
Having said that, it is highly questionable whether liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation 
have produced the alleged efficiency gains of open international competition in public utilities. 
Evidently contradictory, the concrete effects of restructuring have to be cautiously assessed. 
First, table 2 shows that, given the present level of technology, relevant sectors of public utilities 
are still subject to a natural monopoly market structure so that public intervention is essential, 
                                                          
21  Such a separation of activities is provided for in the European Community by the legislation regulating liberal-
isation in the sector, but the rationale is the prevention of excessive concentration due to vertical integration 
rather than the adaptation of the regulatory framework to the market led conduct of economic actors (Heer-
ings, 1994: 5-6). As for concentration and vertical integration in particular, see pp. ??? (specify where in the 
chapter). 
22  When public entities are deliberately excluded from tendering procedures, the fragmentation of a large public 
enterprise in several operating units therefore allows a wider participation of private undertakings to the auc-
tion. 
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especially in case of “private” natural monopolies when operations are delegated to private 
subjects. In the presence of natural monopoly, some form of competition may be introduced 
through periodic bidding procedures, but the effectiveness of the so called Demsetz competition 
is usually limited by the typical practice of long term agreements in contracting out. Regulation 
therefore appears as a response to the threat of monopolistic behaviour, although its functioning 
may be altered by the asymmetry of information between the regulator and the operator23. The 
situation in which the monopoly holder faces no regulation is however characterised by the 
“deadweight” loss, so termed to describe the ensuing loss of welfare (Plane, 1998: 38). Second, 
even in the sectors open to competition, market contestability tends to remain low due to the 
required capital, technology and critical firm dimensions. Information is also crucial and the rela-
tively limited number of competitors facilitates oligopolistic conduct; whereas the absence of ap-
propriate regulation is followed by moves towards concentration and the entrenchment of new 
monopolies.  
 
In this sense, the Telecommunications Deregulation Act of 1996 providing for full deregulation in 
the US seems to have unleashed monopolisation rather than open competition. As a matter of 
fact, corporations in which AT&T had been unbundled have by now shown a remarkable attitude 
towards merging in a giant conglomerate with no regulation of competition nor service supervi-
sion. Indeed, the alleged collusive conduct of those firms has led to an increase in rates contra-
ry to the expected tariff cuts (Lowry, 1997; Mills, 1997). Similar processes are being acknowl-
edged world-wide, with very few major operators reckoned to remain on the global market in the 
next years due to concentration. Despite the more consistent though declining technical difficul-
ties in trading electricity across national boundaries, the pattern of pretended liberalisation in 
telecommunications is being reproduced in other sectors, as it is proved by deregulation, privat-
isation and concentration also occurring in the electricity industry. As in the telecommunications 
sector, privatisation of electricity utilities and the pursuit of profitable rate structures by operators 
have led to significant price increases for small consumers and to concurrent reductions for 
large consumers as TNCs happen to be. Although the overall prices have been reduced as a 
consequence of competition, there is evidence of an unbalanced distribution of benefits as the 
bargaining power of consumers is proportional to the purchased amount (Martin and White, 
1998: 221-226). As it has been pointed out (Martin, 1993: 106-114), this clearly corresponds to 
the reversal of cross-subsidies, deployed by public enterprises, in favour of the better-off and of 
the entities which have long been demanding for such a transnational shift of policies in the pro-
vision of public services. It now appears that privatisation and the international restructuring of 
                                                          
23 The asymmetry-of-information problem is due to the fact that the regulator has rarely access to the complete 
information possessed by the operator. 
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 public utilities does not only correspond to a substantial transfer of resources from the public to 
private operators, but also to an undue subtraction of welfare. 
 
Yet, concerns for the outcomes of public utility restructuring are not only limited to direct but also 
to indirect repercussions on the public good, due to the induced variations in the conduct of pub-
lic enterprises. In theory, as a consequence of the international industrial restructuring, the most 
competitive enterprises are expected to edge out of the most appealing market segments all 
those which do not enjoy equivalent comparative advantages. This implies that, in the absence 
of a comprehensive and effective international competition policy, deregulation or inadequate 
regulation at national level will offer TNCs opportunities to restrain public enterprises’ compe-
tence to segments of low or none profitability. Under the menace of the so called “cream skim-
ming” effect (Kerf, 1995), public enterprises have in several cases adapted their organisational 
structure and their behaviour to respond to market signals and therefore compete on the basis 
of comparative advantages. Until recently, the most diffused legal status of public enterprises 
used in fact to be that of departments or divisions within public administrations, as in the case of 
the British DSOs at local level (Hall, 1998a: 67-68). In a liberalised environment, such organisa-
tional structure hardly enables public enterprises to compete with large TNCs on a "level playing 
field", due to clear disadvantages suffered in attaining commercial objectives. First, due to their 
national or local range of action, public enterprises do not dispose of the required experience to 
operate on an international basis so as to benefit from adequate economies of scale. Second, 
the purpose to accomplish a social function by providing a service to the public on equitable and 
non-discriminatory conditions does not correspond to the pursuit of profit as the only indicator of 
performance. Finally, far more than large TNCs, public enterprises happen to be subjected to 
political interference which can distort the economic and occasonally the social efficiency of 
their actions. Accordingly, corporatisation or the passage from the previous legal form to that of 
independent undertaking with retained public ownership, altogether with the adoption of com-
mercial management and accounting practices, have generally facilitated the competition be-
tween the public and the private sector (Paddon, 1998: 59).  
In an increasing number of public utility sectors and markets, public enterprises are competing 
successfully with their privately owned opponents, spreading their operations both nationally 
and internationally although many of them still have to abide by regulatory restrictions (Hall, 
1998a: 71-78). A remarkable though not unique example, the French SOE Electricité de France 
(EDF) is in a position to periodically pay dividends to the state. Furthermore, empirical evidence 
from several industries, i.e. electricity and water, indicates that public enterprises attain no infe-
rior standards of economic efficiency and cost-effectiveness than privatised companies (Hall, 
1998b: 127-129). It is hence possible to infer that the reforms undergone by modern public en-
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terprises have undermined the major neo-liberal argument in favour of privatisation, that is to 
say the enhanced operating efficiency. Notwithstanding, many profitable public enterprises have 
been and are in the process to be sold, as in the paradigmatic case of the municipal electricity, 
gas and water utilities of Berlin (Hall, 1998a: 79-80). The observed trend manifestly strengthens 
the conviction that the real motivations of public utility delegation to the private sector are of 
budgetary and financial rather than functional nature. As in many instances the increased effi-
ciency and cost-effectiveness attributable to the corporatisation and commercialisation in the 
management of public enterprises are not valued enough to elude the transfer of ownership or 
contracting out to the private sector, considerable opportunities are lost for the correct operation 
of utilities in the public interest. Even after the introduction of commercial considerations in the 
performance of their activities, public enterprises appear to retain a more pronounced attitude to 
contribute to the accomplishment of social and environmental policies than private corporations. 
The diversion of resources to non profitable destinations explains how the costs related to the 
adjustment of commercial strategies may be rewarded with some form of compensation (Hall, 
1998a: 80-81). In effect, modern public enterprises respond to market rules as well as to diffuse 
expectations of intervention in the common good. However, it is predictable that in the absence 
of comparable compensatory mechanisms the trade-off between commercial and social consid-
erations would inevitably hinder the fulfilment of public enterprises’ mandate, with a consequent 
prejudice against their nature and existence as such.  
 
As shown above, the introduction of market-led considerations in the management of 
public services and utilities involves the risk of frustrating the legitimate interest of 
citizenship to be assured minimum standards of life regardless from the ability to pay 
prices imposed by private monopolists or oligopolists. In other words, the persistence of 
private natural monopolies and the tendency to concentration in the field of public utilities 
bears the threat of market failure, potentially evading the liberal argument of privatisation 
as a catalyst for reduced costs and increased productive and allocative efficiency 
(Hemming and Mansoor, 1988: 12-15). A challenge for policy-makers to manage the 
globalisation process, the possibility of conflicts between private and public interests 
affecting the domain of public utilities calls for renewed attention to the conduct of TNCs. 
In addition, the redistributive unbalance produced by the international industrial 
restructuring necessitates the implementation of alternative policies to the neo-liberal 
approach in the operation of public utilities. 
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 2. International restructuring and concentration in water  
supply and sewerage  
 
In this chapter, we consider the case of the global water industry as paradigmatic for the public 
interest at stake rather than for the scale of the restructuring processes. However, a few histor-
ical remarks reveal the striking endurance of private operators’ efforts to determine a similar 
global restructuring to that experienced in other public utilities. In particular, concentration in the 
water industry takes the form of a territorially fragmented though enlarged diffusion, simultane-
ously fostered by and laying the ground for typically monopolistic behaviour and collusive prac-
tices. Finally, the conduct of large TNCs and the ensuing distortion of the proposed purposes of 
such public utility are enabled by the legal framework at national and supranational level. 
 
2.1.  The rationale for treating the water sector: water as an  
essential resource 
 
Table 1 suggests that, at global level, the aggregate amount of revenues from the privatisation 
of water utilities is minimal as compared to the transfer of capital involved in other infrastructure 
sectors24. Nevertheless, keen attention to the analogue trend of international restructuring of 
water provision at global level is indispensable. Such a focus is urged in the light of the tremen-
dous impact of water supply and sewerage on living conditions for rural and urban communities, 
not to neglect the function of water as a precondition to economic and social development 
(EBRD, 1996: 30).  
 
The strategic importance of water supply and sewerage for the whole society is given by the 
considerable extent to which the continuous, equal and universal access to the above service 
affects the subsistence and quality of life, not to mention the social stability, of local communi-
ties. Clean water is in fact used for drinking as well as for sanitary purposes, as its pureness 
plays a fundamental role in protecting the public health, i.e. in the prevention of epidemic dis-
eases. In the latter sense, the demand for improved sanitation after protracted underinvestment 
in infrastructure is largely growing in outnumbered countries, not excluded the most advanced 
economies. Furthermore, mainly due to industrialisation and pollution, newly acknowledged mi-
croorganisms are becoming resistant to water treatment. This was shown by the case of the 
water-borne virus cryptosporidiosis infecting more than 400,000 people and causing the death 
                                                          
24   See Table 1 above, page 10. 
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of more than 100 in Milwaukee in 1993, together with the observed increase in infections 
caused by opportunistic pathogens. Concerns are also related to the inadequacy or unhealthy 
conditions of water supplies in developing countries25. 
 
On the other hand, water intervenes as a basic input in the production cycle ranging from agri-
culture to electricity and power generation to end up with the heavy industry (WIUC, 1985: 
6-7)26.   Principally as a result of the industrial use of water, overuse, misuse and pollution are 
the major causes of scarcity for this hardly, and thus costly, renewable natural resource27. 
Whether in Russia the use of water per person may reach 500 liters per day, including industrial 
uses, in the USA the average amount is 1,300 liters per person, per day, excluded industrial 
uses. While the use of renewable water, namely rain and snow, is currently limited to 10 percent 
surface water, characterised for being not renewable, is more and more contaminated from in-
dustrial pollution. As the consumption of surface water is faster than its replacement, recycling 
and desalinisation are likely to become relatively soon the remaining technological solutions, 
indeed as high-priced as sophisticated28. 
 
It now appears that the water sector requires drastic measures at universal level in order to face 
the emergencies of the next century. In conclusion, heavy investments are expected as a re-
sponse to the rising demand for increased sanitary standards of water supplies, whilst the se-
vere rationalisation of the uses of water has by this time become indispensable. The global de-
mand for water is in fact spiralling upward, consequently to the proliferation of the world popula-
tion and to its employment in steadily larger production cycles. A tentative answer, adapting the 
social and more general objectives to commercial considerations, has been so far furnished by 
the neo-liberal theory influencing the international restructuring and privatisation of the water 
industry.     
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25  Source: Kelley, M. “For Tim Ford, Water Runs in the Family” on Internet. Tim Ford is Associate Professor and 
Director of the Program in Water and Health at the Harvard School of Public Health. 
26  WIUC stands for the Water Industry Unions Committee. 
27  On the scarcity of water, see Serageldin (1995: 1-2) and Winpenny (1994: 2-5). 
28  Source: Kelley, M. “For Tim Ford, Water Runs in the Family” on Internet. See note 26. 
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 2.2.  The neo-liberal approach in the operation of water utilities 
and related concerns 
 
Stemming from the above considerations, the neo-liberal doctrine has asserted the necessity for 
managing water exclusively as an economic, namely tradable, resource to allocate by means of 
full pricing at cost. According to this approach, tariffs have not only to reflect production costs, 
but also to encompass opportunity costs due to the value of alternative uses of the traded good. 
The abolishment of public subsidies and reliance on demand, in order to assess the effective 
value of supplied water, would allow the functioning of flexible markets reducing waste, pollution 
and prices in consequence of the enhanced efficiency (Winpenny, 1994: 9-11).  
 
In reality, privatisation programmes underpinned by the diffusion of neo-liberal tenets have in 
most cases substituted a public with a private natural monopoly, without tempering market im-
perfections as in theory it is supposed. Conversely, following privatisation of water utilities in 
developed and developing countries, households and small firms repeatedly had to face in-
creased barriers to water access as a result of marked rises in tariffs. Subsequent to 1989 pri-
vatisation in the UK, for instance, consumers disconnected from water provision for failing to 
pay rates augmented by 200 percent from 1991 to 1992. If considered the removal of public 
subsidies financed by taxation and the increase in prices, it appears that privatisation corre-
sponds to a transfer of welfare from small to large consumers, namely from the poor to the bet-
ter-off. Under full pricing at cost in the absence of competition, as in the case of local monopo-
lies granted to water operators, tariffs are in fact marked-up also to cover dividends to be dis-
tributed to shareholders and multiplied stipends for management (Martin, 1993: 116-125)29.  
 
Precluded access to such an essential service has drastic effects in many developing countries 
and particularly in Africa. In Côte d’Ivoire where water provision is delegated to Société de Dis-
tribution d’Eau de la Côte d’Ivoire (SODECI), an affiliate to the French TNC SAUR/Bouygues, 
the share of people connected to a water supply in the capital city Abidjan fell from 57 percent in 
1977 to 47 percent in 198330. In other African countries having resorted to privatisation, the dif-
ference in price between piped water, concentrated in urban districts, and water distributed by 
                                                          
29  As it will be shown later, prices are often fixed by companies so as to cover bribes to local authorities aimed at 
being awarded the concession of water utilities operation. 
30  In 1990, sales of SODECI amounted to US$ 90.3 million. Source: UNCTAD (1996b: 109). In 1993, SODECI’s 
income was about US$ 40 million. Source: Best Practice in Urban Water Supply Côte d’Ivoire’s SODECI – 
Capacity Building for Better Service on Internet. 
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private vendors in non connected areas is astonishing, as vendors can afford imposing ten to 
thirty-fold charges. This is a lucrative business turned into exploitation, as the elderly have to 
spend a significant part of their low income in order to attain minimal quantities of water. Such 
exaggerated rates are set on the assumption that, whatever the burden, people cannot re-
nounce buying water below survival threshold31. Which generally occurs, unless unsustainable 
pricing drives to re-use of the purchased water therefore facilitating epidemics as the cholera 
infection plaguing Peru in 1991. On the other hand, due to the costs and economic risks of con-
structing and operating treatment plants and pipelines, private contractors do not see connect-
ing areas out of the profitable urban districts as a worthwhile investment. As a result, the con-
tracting out of water provision seems to hamper development rather than promote national wel-
fare and a preferable distribution of resources between local élites and disadvantaged masses.  
 
Moreover, the purported efficiencies linked to private involvement in water utilities operation 
have not been realised in practice, as full pricing at cost does not necessarily constitute a de-
terrent to waste and over-use. Conversely, the decreasing costs of extracting larger amounts of 
water from natural sources induce to irresponsible conduct on behalf of market-led subjects as 
private operators. In 5 years since privatisation of UK utilities, more than 20 courses accordingly 
dried up, with invaluable damages to the environment and local communities (Martin, 1993: 
116-125). 
 
It now appears that concern for the activity of large TNCs in the water industry is justified by 
high risks of market failure with adverse implications for the public good. In particular, those 
consist of significant impediments to the continuous, equal and universal access to water sup-
ply. Market failure itself is undoubtedly determined by conflicting interests between the private 
sector and the public as well as by market imperfections, such as natural monopoly structure 
and tendency to concentration of undertakings at global level. Concentration in the water indus-
try has reached a considerable extent with the control of the world market in the hands of nine 
firms only, constituting two large groups headed by the French corporations Lyonnaise des 
Eaux and Générale des Eaux and three smaller undertakings (PSPRU, 1996: 8). Predominance 
of French-based TNCs might look surprising, if considered the presence of SAUR/Bouygues32 
also, but there are clear historical reasons to explain the ascertained success. Concentration is 
one of the major issues to take into account so as to reconcile the operation of water utilities 
with public purposes. Excessive market power and the resulting corporate power enlarge in fact 
                                                          
31  In this last respect, it can be easily assumed that the percentage of total income spent for water by the elderly 
does not change relevantly despite the rise in tariffs.  
32  SAUR stands for Société d’Aménagement Urbain et Rural. 
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 the scope for transnational firms’ unaccountability, so that the excluded openness represent an 
obstacle to managing this area of global trade through democratisation. However, before pro-
ceeding to examine the determinants of international concentration in the water industry, it is 
advisable to treat the historical reasons of the largest water TNCs’ market dominance and to 
observe the magnitude of privatisation at international level.  
 
2.3.  Some mentions on the history of the water industry: the 
origins of French-based TNCs’ market dominance  
 
In all ancient civilizations, water supply seems to have been a public sector activity due to the 
strategic relevance of water, especially in times of war (Roth, 1987: 251-259). Entrepreneurial 
initiative has therefore been excluded from such field until modern times. The history of the prin-
cipal private operators in the global water industry shows that the long ago acquired leadership 
can be explained in the light of their ability to expand without facing real competition, rather than 
their early establishment. Which partially explicates the entrenchment of their monopolistic atti-
tude. 
 
Since 1782, the brothers Perrier pioneered private supply of piped water in France laying the 
ground for a flourishing national industry. While in the second half of the nineteenth century 
French private companies started to enter foreign markets on a global scale, yet concentrating 
their operations in Spain and the African part of the colonial empire, in the twentieth century 
they became the undisputed leaders at both national and international levels (Roth, 1987: 
251-259). The availability of such a favourable environment as colonial territories was of great 
importance to the growth of French enterprises, in that the acquired critical size to enjoy scale 
economies granted a pervasive business expansion throughout developing and developed 
markets33. Furthermore, the oligopoly structure of the domestic market and the enduring ab-
sence of appreciable competition abroad were the grounds of the aggressive strategies of in-
ternational growth designed and implemented by French firms. 
 
Yet, the predominance of French companies is not primarily due to their role as precursors in 
water provision, as the initiative of the brothers Perrier had been preceded by the example of 
private operation in London. Indeed, English competitors were the first to be granted concession 
in other countries, that is to say in Berlin in 1856 and in Cannes in 1866 (Roth, 1987: 251-259), 
                                                          
33  A similar role was played by the British colonial empire in the emergence of TNCs in the telecommunications 
sector (Martin, 1993: 113).   
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but were soon submitted to nationalisation by the British government. With the water industry 
predominantly in private hands, water-related desease and contamination were widespread, so 
that the recognition of the connection between water quality and public health was the main 
reason for the shift to public ownership and control. More precisely, by the 1870s, preference for 
a collectivist solution was the result of the recent failure of the British industry to respond to the 
needs of the consumer (WIUC, 1985: 16-19). Public ownership of water utilities was maintened 
until recently, when in 1989 the contracting out of English and Welsh water authorities led to the 
emergence of UK TNCs Northumbrian, North West, Severn-Trent, Thames and Welsh Water. In 
that occasion, French companies benefited from compulsory competitive tendering to acquire 
half of the divested SOEs (Martin, 1993: 116-125). So that they succeeded in extending their 
presence in a profitable foreign market and, at the same time, in restricting business opportuni-
ties for the newly privatised British rivals.  
 
The consolidation of market power has also been favoured by French government’s protection-
ist attitude towards domestic-based TNCs. This was clearly demonstrated by the opposition of 
France to the introduction of substantial competition and publicity rules applicable to water con-
cessions in the EC Council Directive regulating procurement procedures in the water, energy, 
telecommunications and transport sectors (Kerf, 1995: 87-89)34. As it will also be shown below, 
direct and indirect public support to French firms is relevant to the flourishing of national water 
industry35.  
 
 
2.4.  The international scale of privatised water utilities 
 
As anticipated, the world market in water supply and sewerage is limited when compared to that 
of other utilities. The reason can generally be found in the public nature of water provision, 
which renders water a less tradable resource than electricity and gas or other services such as 
telecommunications. Notwithstanding, pressures for private sector involvement are mounting 
and the trend towards enhanced privatisation is marked. The international scale of privatised 
water utilities has thus to be interpreted within such continuous process. 
                                                          
34  For the European Council Directive 90/531/EEC of 17 September, see the Official Journal of the European 
Communities: OJ 1990 L 297/1. The 1990 Directive was subsequently amended, although without significant 
changes in matters relevant to our study, by European Council Directive 93/38/EEC of 14 June 1993. See OJ 
1993 L 199/84.  
35  See paragraph 3.1, page 44, “The domestic regulatory framewor: the French model system”. 
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 Figure 1. Water supply in EU: public or private/mixed 
(percentage of population supplied by each type) 
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Figure 1 shows that in most EU member countries, public provision of water is prevailing, often 
under the competence of municipal enterprises, whilst only France and the UK have almost en-
tirely privatised the sector. Also, an appreciable presence of private operators is observed in 
Spain. However, it should be noted that liberalisation is in the process of being introduced in It-
aly, eventually opening the way for a profitable market. Moreover, the imminent sale of Berliner 
Wasser Betriebe, the municipal utility of Berlin, should draw the attention to the potential dyna-
mism of the European market.   
 
In other developed countries, such as the USA and Canada, private sector involvement is on 
the increase by means of contracting out rather than divestiture. About 71 percent of the nearly 
22,000 American utilities is publicly owned, mainly by municipalities, many of which opt for in-
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ternal restructuring of the enterprise as an alternative to privatisation (Martin and White, 1998: 
227-230).  
 
Also in developing countries, the advancement of privatisation generally excludes the bare sale 
of water utilities, as the most recurrent contractual arrangements vary from management and 
operation contracting out to leasing, concession, BOT and BOO agreements. In the Asia Pacific 
region, India is the only country seemingly impermeable to private sector participation in water 
supply and sewerage, as well as water treatment (Paddon, 1998: 61-62). Examples of privatisa-
tion in Latin America are conspicuous: Buenos Aires, Cordoba, Rosario and Santa Fe in Argen-
tina; Cancun in Mexico; Baranquilla, Florencia, Cartagena and Tunja in Colombia; Santiago in 
Chile and Campos in Brazil (Saravia, 1998: 185-191). As for Africa, table 3 provides the details 
of major cases.Table 3. Main privatisations of water uitlities in Africa, as of June 1996 
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Country Company and legal status Type of contract International operator 
Côte d’Ivoire Public ownership of facilities 
and private operating compa-
ny (SODECI) 
From 1960, leasing contract, 
then concession renewed 
every 15 years on negotiat-
ed basis 
SAUR 
Guinea Public asset-owing company 
(SONEG) 
Leasing contract signed 
end-1989 for a 10-year 
term, awarded after interna-
tional tendering 
SAUR-CGE (Compagnie 
Générale des Eaux) 
Guinea-Bissau* Public enterprise (EAGB) + 
private management partners 
Management contract (pri-
vate partner’s remuneration 
75% fixed, 25% perfor-
mance-linked) 
EDF-Lyonnaise des Eaux 
Gabon* 64% public company + indirect 
shareholding (SEEG)  
private partner (SOCAGI) 
Management contract 
signed in 1993 after tender-
ing 
Development towards a 
concession under way with 
the reduced state share in 
SEEG capital 
EDF-GQ1- 
Lyonnaise des Eaux 
Mali* Public enterprise (EDM) 
Private management partner 
(SHEC) 
4-year overall management 
contract 
SAUR-EDF- 
HQ1-SOGEMA 
Senegal Public asset-owing company 
(SONES) 
Private operating company 
(SDE) 
10-year leasing contract 
from 1995 after international 
tendering 
SAUR 
Central African Re-
public 
Public asset-owing company 
(SNE) 
Private operating company 
(SODECA) 
15-year leasing contract 
from 1991 after international 
tendering 
SAUR 
Morocco* 
(Casablanca) 
Public company (RAD) Private 
concessionaire (Maghrébienne 
des Eaux) 
30-year distribution conces-
sion  
after tendering  
Lyonnaise des 
Eaux-EDF-ENDESA- 
Aguas de Barcelona 
Note: (*) = company also involved in electricity.   Source: Plane (1998: 21). 
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Finally, in CEE countries, privatisation has mainly taken place in the Czech Republic and Hun-
gary, with some cases in Poland. In respect of the responsibility of regional state agencies un-
der the former regimes, the restructuring of the industry has occured through decentralisation at 
municipal level. Ironically, the lost opportunity to benefit from economies of scale in the opera-
tion of utilities has caused a loss in terms of efficiency and cost-effectiveness (Hall, 1998b: 
122-123). 
 
Table 4. Privatised water concessions in CEE, as of May 1997 
 
Country Location Company Multinational Per cent 
owned 
Czech Repub-
lic 
Brno Brno VaK Lyonnaise des Eaux 47 
 Ostrava Severomoravske 
VaK 
Lyonnaise des Eaux 34 
 Karlsbad Vodarny Karlovy 
Vary 
Lyonnaise des Eaux 44 
 North Bohemia SCVK Hyder 35.6 
 Southern Bo-
hemia 
VAKJC Anglian Water 34 
 Pilsen Vodarna Pilsen Generale des Eaux 98 
     
Hungary Kaposvar Eaux de Kaspovar Lyonnaise des Eaux 35 
 Szeged Szegedi Vizmu Generale des Eaux 49 
 Pecs Pecsi Vizmu Lyonnaise des Eaux 48 
 Budapest Budapest Water Lyonnaise des 
Eaux/RWE 
25 
     
Poland Gdansk SAUR Neptun 
Gdansk 
SAUR 51 
 Poznan - Lyonnaise des Eaux ? 
Source: Hall (1998b: 123) from PSPRU database. 
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 It is hereby  possible to formulate two commentaries on the above set of information. Despite 
its relatively limited magnitude in respect of other industries, privatisation of water utilities at 
global level cannot be neglected due to the pronounced tendency to increase. On the other 
hand, the persistence of large areas of public competence in water supply and sewerage en-
courages to explore alternatives to neo-liberal policies.  
 
2.5.  TNCs’ conduct and the dynamics of international  
concentration in the water sector 
 
A product of the ongoing international restructuring of the water industry, concentration is one of 
the crucial issues in the debate on private involvement in water provision. In this respect, the 
striking importance of an effective regulation in the water and wastewater sector is given by a 
strong tendency to monopolistic supply, so that its rationale is to identify in the protection of 
consumers from unfair tariffs and poor quality service (World Bank, 1996: 61). As a matter of 
fact, the domestic and supranational regulatory framework in which the major water TNCs act 
seem to provide an enabling environment for unfair practices. Consequently, concentration de-
serves to be cautiously explored in all its determinants before proposing alternative approaches 
in managing global trade in the water industry, which prove more adequate to encounter the le-
gitimate interests of the should-be ultimate beneficiaries. 
 
2.5.1.  Integration and concentration in the water industry  
 
Before analysing growth and concentration determinants of French water TNCs, some prelimi-
nary remarks on corporations’ behaviour causing market dominance are necessary. Firms tend 
to reach the critical size to enjoy economies of scale integrating the activities of operating units 
in a vertical or in a horinzontal direction. On the one hand, vertical integration corresponds to 
the location of different parts of the value added chain in different places and therefore in differ-
ent markets, also requiring the central co-ordination of all different activities implemented in the 
production process. Vertical integration gives rise, for instance, to intra-firm trade increasingly 
occurring within TNCs, so that it constitutes a major component of global trade. Depending on 
the country observed, intra-firm trade has been estimated as ranging around 24 and 38 percent 
of total exports, while varying from 14 to 43 percent of total imports. In addition, significant in-
tra-firm flows of goods and even more of services escape measurement, so that figures should 
be notably higher (UNCTAD, 1996: 103). It is important not to restrict vertical integration to the 
production of intermediate goods only, as also services like research and development (R&D) 
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are to be considered as factor inputs which tend to be internalised by the firm. Finally, internali-
sation of production activities is due to uncertainties related to tariffs and technical barriers to 
trade and, more generally, to the costs of arm’s length trade with third parties.  
 
On the other hand, horizontal integration leads an enterprise to produce the same good or ser-
vice in different locations, chosen in response to the specific markets targeted, as well as 
co-ordinate the activities performed in different places according to a single marketing strategy. 
Unlike vertical integration, which can be seen as an attempt to gain full control of the entire 
process leading to the finished product, horizontal integration is rather dictated by the urge to 
cyclically enlarge the enjoyed economies of scale. The extension of the range of activities car-
ried out by the firm further results in a network of synergies referring to the mother company, 
with concurrent elements of both vertical and horizontal integration. Techniques adopted in or-
der to expand the firm’s volume of business comprehend take-overs of private or public compet-
itors, mergers and the launching of new ventures. Take-overs are acquisitions of ownership of, 
or control on, competing entities with all their endowments, inclusive of the relative market 
shares. Which implies that the expanding enterprise, establishing a new subsidiary, diminishes 
the competition limiting its operations in a given market. When deciding whether to opt for a 
take-over or a new venture, investors rely on a cost-benefit analysis of time and capital required 
by a greenfield investment as compared to the price for gaining direct access to an introduced 
activity. So that acquisitions are likely to be preferred, but if the investor is willing to enter a 
market where he has not the necessary level of knowledge then he might choose to partner with 
an other investor, sharing both ownership rights and risks of the new venture. 
 
Major French water companies pursue vertical integration through the ownership of specialist 
engineering subsidiaries, like OTV for Générale des Eaux and Degremont depending from Ly-
onnaise des Eaux. These subsidiaries often obtain contracts to carry out capital works for the 
operating subsidiaries of their own group. For instance, in 1992 the operation of the water sys-
tem of Rostock, eastern Germany, was contracted out for 25 years to Eurawasser, a venture 
jointly owned by the German firm Thyssen and Lyonnaise des Eaux, while the concession for 
the new sewage treatment plant was awarded to Degremont36. 
Horizontal integration of French companies has historically taken place by take-overs of private 
competitors, although the massive divestitures of SOEs have recently allowed to target public 
competitors as well, and by the creation of new ventures to win concessions from local authori-
ties. The latest take-over of a private firm is the acquisition of CISE by SAUR, concluded at the 
                                                          
36  Source: Public Services Privatisation Research Unit (PSPRU). 
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 beginning of January 1997. Apart from joint ventures with foreign undertakings, as in the case 
of Eurawasser, French enterprises establish joint ventures among themselves represented by 
the example of Stéphanoise des Eaux in St Étienne, with joint ownership of Générale des Eaux 
and Lyonnaise des Eaux. The same two practices are also followed abroad. Wherever the tar-
get company is well established, as in the USA, UK, Spain and Italy, preference is given to 
gaining control through the purchase of shares. Where such conditions are not met, as in the 
Philippines or Argentina, they opt instead for setting up new ventures to win concessions. In 
other circumstances, as it occurred in the Czech and Hungarian towns of Karlovy Vary vak and 
Pecsi Vizmu respectively, the purchase of shares in the municipal companies implies the effec-
tive creation of new joint ventures which automatically hold the concessions evading competitive 
tendering procedures37. As far as mergers are concerned, a good example is the investment of 
Lyonnaise des Eaux in the acquisition of the total shares of Northumbrian Water to merge it with 
the already owned, smaller company North East Water. The UK regulator and monopolies 
commission found no restriction to competition, but required a reduction in prices as a condition 
of allowing the merger.   
 
2.5.2.  Collusive conduct and concentration 
 
Instead of by exclusive means of investment, horizontal concentration in a given industry can 
also take place through collusive behaviour involving restrictive agreements between potential 
rivals at the same stage of production. Collusion therefore includes the constitution of combines 
and cartels, whose members unite the reciprocal market power by co-ordination, in order to im-
pose the desired oligopoly market structure and thus restrain the action of other competitors. As 
it has been demonstrated by the theory of games, with particular reference to the prisoner’s 
game, collusion tends to be difficult to enforce between the parties to the restrictive agreement, 
due to the lack of trust in each other and the subsequent induction to cheat. In this respect, it 
has been interestingly said that merger is equivalent to internalising collusion by bringing the fa-
cilities under common ownership and control (Casson, 1993: 374-377). Accordingly, mergers 
are functional to impose market power to competitors strengthening collusive practices. All 
those practices are extremely deceptive as they distort the correct allocation of resources within 
the market resulting in the emergence of a horizontally integrated monopolistic TNC. It is possi-
ble to infer that TNCs’ attitude towards competition is a threat of market failure as it hinders the 
achievement of all the proposed benefits of fair competition.  
 
                                                          
37  Source: Public Services Privatisation Research Unit (PSPRU). 
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The practice of French TNCs concerning arrangements restrictive of competition in the water 
industry is abundant and ranges from joint ventures for specific investment projects to more 
lasting strategic alliances between firms assembled in pools. As mentioned, companies active 
on the global water and sewerage market happen to have gathered in two large groups headed 
by French enterprises, Lyonnaise des Eaux/Aguas de Barcelona and Générale des 
Eaux/Thames, with SAUR/Bouygues, Severn-Trent and North West Water as minor though non 
negligible actors (PSPRU, 1996: 7-9)38. Not only competition is practically non existent within 
large groups, but collusive agreements are also entered between groups and single enterprises 
so as to occasionally form ad hoc transversal consortia apt to succeed in tendering. For in-
stance, in 1993 bid for Aguas de Argentina the Lyonnaise des Eaux, Générale des Eaux, Aguas 
de Barcelona and Anglian Water combine easily prevailed over the only opposition of Thames 
Water. Yet, 1995 bid in South Australia was adjudicated by the alliance between Thames Water 
and Générale des Eaux. In 1995, it was the time of Générale des Eaux and SAUR/Bouygues to 
enter an alliance with the purpose of concurrently bidding for the small British water company 
Mid Kent Holdings (PSPRU, 1996: 8). Moreover, as shown by Table 2 below, water TNCs es-
tablish a number of links to TNCs mainly operating in sectors other than water supply, varying 
from simple financial support to joint ventures.  
                                                          
38  Welsh Water is not included among global competitors, as it prefers to limit its operations to the UK and 
Czech markets rather than participate to competition world-wide. 
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  Table 5. Collaboration and joint ventures involving water TNCs 
 
Company  C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 
Partner Country           
Aguas de Barcelona E  • • • •      
Alcatel F    •       
Anglian Water UK •   • •      
AT&T USA    •       
Bechtel USA       •    
Canal de Isabel II E •          
Eléctricité de France F    • •  •    
Endesa E •  •  •  •    
GdF F •          
Générale des Eaux F • •   •    •  
Hidrocantabrico E •   •       
Hydro-Quebec C       •    
Italgas I    •       
Italmmobiliare I     •      
Lurgi Bamag D          • 
Lyonnaise des Eaux F • •  •       
Mitsubishi J     •      
Pirelli  I    •       
RWE D    •       
Thames Water UK    •       
Thyssen D     •      
Total F     •      
Tractebel B          • 
Wessex Water UK •          
Companies: C1=Aguas de Barcelona; C2=Anglian Water; C3=Canal de Isabel II; C4=Générale 
des Eaux; C5=Lyonnaise des Eaux; C6=North West Water; C7=SAUR/Bouygues; C8=Severn 
Trent; C9=Thames Water; C10=WMX Technologies. Countries: B=Belgium; C=Canada; 
D=Germany; E=Spain; F=France; I=Italy; J=Japan; UK=United Kingdom; USA=United States of 
America 
Source: PSPRU (1996) 
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Among the most effective reasons for collusive practices as cartels and combines are the 
avoidance of costs associated with competitive tendering and profits ensured to the winning 
bidder, due to the granted monopoly position. Another common practice to elude competition is 
the use of deliberate loss leaders in tendering: a subsidiary to a TNC takes part to an auction 
eliminating competition, despite financial losses which are compensated by transfers from the 
mother company. Expected profits from the obtained monopoly are in fact deemed worth such a 
temporary deficit (PSPRU, 1996: 10-14). There is evidence that the practice of loss leaders is a 
distortion of the correct functioning of tendering procedures as the concession is awarded on 
the ground of falsified information. At the pre-entry level, this suggests that when a private mo-
nopoly holder substitutes a public one the former tends to reproduce the latter’s behaviour as is 
the case of anti-competitive cross-subsidisation. However, the transfer of financial resources 
from the mother company to its subsidiary not only occurs in contrast with market signals. It also 
pursues a private interest as profit maximisation which does not necessarily correspond to the 
essential objective of cross-subsidies in the public sector: granting indiscriminate access to sof-
tened water in the public good. On the other hand, at the post-entry level, loss leaders may be 
tempted to compensate the losses suffered by increasing prices39 or, in the absence of any 
profit regulation, by maximising profits thanks to cost cuts affecting the quality of the service 
provided. In such a perspective, the practice of loss leaders would result in a substantial and 
unfair transfer of welfare from consumers to the operators of utilities equivalent to the public 
subsidisation of private profits. In conclusion, the mere respect of procedural rules regulating the 
delegation of public services to private operators is insufficient to avoid serious restrictions to 
competition and misconduct on behalf of incumbent undertakings. It has also to be noted that 
considerable difficulties are faced by national competition authorities acting with insufficient or 
non-existent co-operation, due to the impediments in collecting the necessary evidence to iden-
tify alleged predatory behaviours as the practice of loss leaders.      
 
 
 
                                                          
39  Such practice could reveal particularly adverse in case of weak control of prices by local authorities or even 
worse in the absence of any regulation of prices. If water rates are increased on the ground of recovering 
losses incurred by the incumbent undertaking to drive-out rivals of the bidding procedure, the practice of loss 
leaders has to be considered also as a predatory behaviour. In particular, the voluntary underestimation of 
pricing in the winning bid has the strategic purpose of excluding competitors from the auction, which in the 
water sector usually represents the only occasion of competition. On predatory behaviour and predatory pric-
ing, see UNCTAD (1997: 158).  
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 2.5.3.  Expansion to sectors other than water supply and sewerage 
 
Having said this, it is important to note that horizontal expansion of water companies’ activity not 
only occurs under the form of horizontal integration within the water industry, but also encom-
passes several sectors in public services and utilities. Entry in such sectors may seem contra-
dictory to TNCs’ tendency to specialisation leading to market fragmentation, although 
knowledge based production characteristic of globalisation deserves a less simplistic approach. 
In the attempt to explain the international expansion of the firm as a component of corporate 
growth, business theory has assumed the existence of a trade-off between multinationality and 
industrial diversification. In other words, while TNCs will naturally tend to specialise in a single 
industry, corporate conglomerates will tend to limit their activities within a single national market 
(Casson, 1993: 369-371). The case of French water companies represents an evident exception 
to this general statement, in consequence of the extreme versatility of the technical know-how 
acquired. As a matter of fact, all French water TNCs are today firmly present in all continents 
providing an impressive range of public services in addition to water supply and sewerage, in-
cluding catering, telecommunications, construction, energy, environmental services, health, 
housing, security & prisons and transport (PSPRU, 1996: 1-7). 
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Table 6. Presence of TNCs in public sector – worldwide 
Parent Home Country A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 
AES USA ♦   ♦    
Aguas de Barcelona E   ♦     
Anglian Water UK  ♦ ♦  ♦ ♦ ♦ 
ET UK ♦ ♦  ♦   ♦ 
British Gas UK   ♦ ♦  ♦ ♦ 
Camuzzi I   ♦    ♦ 
Eléctricité de France F ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦  ♦ ♦ 
EDS/General Motors USA  ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Endesa E ♦  ♦    ♦ 
Enron USA  ♦ ♦ ♦    
Gazprom R      ♦ ♦ 
GdF F   ♦ ♦  ♦ ♦ 
Générale des Eaux F ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Houston Industries USA   ♦ ♦    
ISS Servisystem DK  ♦ ♦   ♦ ♦ 
Lyonnaise des Eaux F ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
National Grid UK   ♦ ♦    
National Power UK  ♦  ♦   ♦ 
North West Water UK  ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦  ♦ 
Powergen UK    ♦  ♦ ♦ 
Ruhrgas D      ♦ ♦ 
RWE D ♦   ♦  ♦ ♦ 
SAUR/Bouygues F ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Serco UK   ♦ ♦ ♦  ♦ 
Severn Trent UK   ♦    ♦ 
Sodexho F ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦  ♦ ♦ 
Southern Company USA  ♦  ♦  ♦  
Thames Water UK ♦  ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Tractebel B  ♦ ♦ ♦  ♦ ♦ 
Veba D ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦  ♦ ♦ 
Viag D  ♦    ♦ ♦ 
Welsh Water UK  ♦  ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
WMX USA  ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦  ♦ 
Regions: A1=Africa; A2= North America; A3=South & Central America; A4=Asia; A5=Australasia; A6=Central & Eastern 
Europe; A7=Western Europe. Home Countries: B=Belgium; D=Germany; DK=Denmark; E=Spain; F=France; I=Italy; 
R=Russia; UK=United Kingdom; USA=United States of America. Source: PSPRU (1996) 
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Table 7. Synergies – TNCs operating across a number of public services 
  Sector Ca Cl Co Cp Cs Ed En Ev He Hg M P SP T W 
Company Main Busi-
ness 
Home 
Country 
               
Aguas de 
Barcelona 
Water E     ♦  ♦  ♦      ♦ 
BET Cleaning UK ♦ ♦   ♦       ♦ ♦   
Eléctricité de 
France 
Energy F       ♦ ♦       ♦ 
Endesa Energy E   ♦    ♦ ♦       ♦ 
Enron Energy USA       ♦    ♦     
Générale des 
Eaux 
Water F ♦  ♦  ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦  ♦  ♦ ♦ 
Lyonnaise des 
Eaux 
Water F ♦  ♦  ♦  ♦ ♦ ♦  ♦  ♦  ♦ 
North West 
Water 
Water UK ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦           ♦ 
P&O Shipping UK ♦ ♦   ♦       ♦ ♦  ♦ 
RWE Energy D   ♦  ♦  ♦ ♦        
SAUR/ 
Bouygues 
Water F   ♦  ♦  ♦ ♦       ♦ 
Serco Defence UK    ♦ ♦ ♦  ♦  ♦  ♦ ♦   
Severn Trent Water UK        ♦       ♦ 
Sodexho Catering F ♦            ♦   
Southern 
Company 
Energy USA   ♦    ♦         
Thames Water Water UK        ♦   ♦    ♦ 
Tractebel Energy B ♦ ♦ ♦             
Veba Energy D   ♦    ♦         
Viag Energy D   ♦    ♦         
Welsh Water Water UK      ♦         ♦ 
WMX Environment USA       ♦ ♦       ♦ 
Sectors: Ca=Catering; Cl=Cleaning; Co=Communications; Cp=Computers; Cs=Construction; Ed=Education; 
Er=Energy; Ev=Environmental; He=Health; Hg=Housing; M=Manufacturing; P=Property; SP=Security & Prisons; 
T=Transport; W=Water. 
Home Countries: B=Belgium; D=Germany; DK=Denmark; E=Spain; F=France; I=Italy; UK=United Kingdom; 
USA=United States of America.  
Source: PSPRU (1996) 
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In the sectors entered consequently to the increasing efforts to diversify the offer in the field of 
public utilities, such corporations reproduce their attitude towards concentration as well as collu-
sive conduct. For instance, the European market of construction is dominated by three groups 
respectively referring to SAUR/Bouygues, Lyonnaise des Eaux and Générale des Eaux as ma-
jor shareholders. From 1985 to 1989, those groups have impressed an acceleration to concen-
tration within the French market, with the number of competitors being reduced from eight to six 
(Royon, 1991: 43-56). The three groups have recently been fined in France for operating illegal 
cartels for construction contracts. They also tend to collude with the national government, 
demonstrating the public role in sustaining private domestic operators. The European Commis-
sion is in fact prosecuting the French government for breaking EU competition law when it 
awarded the contract to build a football stadium to a joint venture which is 33% owned by each 
of the three groups40. In other sectors where they establish new ventures, like in communica-
tions, water corporations sometimes join electricity companies (PSPRU, 1996: 1-7), as partners 
to share with risks related to entry in a new sector. 
 
There is evidence that investment strategies of French water TNCs are determined by the de-
sire to enlarge the holding’s size and to diversify the business undergone thanks to a certain 
adaptability of the know-how developed in the sector of origin to a wider range of public ser-
vices. However, know-how and expertise interchangeability can furnish an acceptable explana-
tion only for such fields as environmental services, construction and energy, while in others the 
mere diversification of financial risks seems more convincing. Also the decision to establish a 
network of synergies expanding the original competency through a number of sectors is to be 
considered. This strategy, leading to the creation of horizontal industrial empires, is designed 
both to allow future growth along several lines of business development and in particular to offer 
an integrated package of public services in occasion of competitive bids (PSPRU, 1996: 1-7). 
Such an enterprise as Lyonnaise des Eaux is in fact preparing to contend with Générale des 
Eaux for the world leadership in the provision of public services to local communities. In addition 
to diversification, the expansion of business opportunities through synergies has its rationale in 
the furtherance of vertical and horizontal integration at the same time. In 1992, in fact, two sub-
sidiaries to Générale des Eaux, Onyx and Générale de Chauffe, joined to form a new venture to 
transport clinical waste to an incineration plant whose construction had been awarded to Gé-
nérale de Chauffe itself. Générale des Eaux had previously acquired American Medical Interna-
tional (AMI), owning the largest share of private hospitals in the UK, so to connect several rings 
in the vertical chain of the health care sector (Martin, 1993: 123).   
                                                          
40  Source: Public Services Privatisation Research Unit (PSPRU). 
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 The overall expansion of the three French groups has been fuelled by the sustained wave of 
privatisation initiatives of public services world-wide. In the only year 1990, Générale des Eaux 
expanded by more than a third. On the other hand, in 1992, Lyonnaise des Eaux ranked as the 
32nd  TNC by foreign assets as a result of a high growth rate of more than 10 percent in the pe-
riod 1990-1992 (UNCTAD, 1994: 3-18). However, objective difficulties in extending the size of 
the groups at such a pace are reflected in the absence of both French corporations among the 
top 100 TNCs by foreign assets as classified in the following years. Accordingly, pressures for 
cost reductions have since 1996 induced furthered regionalisation and rationalisation of their 
operations with ensuing staff cuts of up to 20% and a greater degree of integration41. Hence, it 
is possible to infer that French water TNCs will increasingly try to exert their substantial corpo-
rate power, even to the limits of abuse, in order to enlarge the respective market power.  
 
 
2.5.4.  Abuse of corporate power and the need to regulate TNCs’ conduct 
 
The abuse of corporate power is one of the most serious forms of misconduct, attempting at a 
fair and equitable management of global trade in public services. The incontestable need to 
regulate major global utilities is thus to take into account, trying to evaluate the instruments 
presently available for such purpose. 
 
As market power produces concentration, concentration leads to augmented market power and 
inevitably to abuse of corporate power, including corruption. Historically, TNCs have proved 
their inclination towards influencing the social and political environment in which they operate, 
so as to maximise the profitability of their actions. In such a perspective, all conditions affecting 
the performance of the firm, not excluded the presence of a public interest opposing aspirations 
to business consolidation and expansion, are susceptible to be considered as economic factors 
to internalise in a growth strategy. Attempts to buy public officials’ favour are therefore conse-
quential to a cost-benefit analysis of bribery, evaluating the proposed advantages as compared 
to the low risks of prosecution and condemnation. The achievement of public objectives is hin-
dered by corruption in that such a practice, not only distorts the rationale for decisions aimed at 
the achievement of the common welfare, but also substantially increases the costs of public 
services provision.  
 
                                                          
41  Source: Public Services Privatisation Research Unit (PSPRU). 
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Corruption in the water industry can be described by a few examples. In 1995 the French city of 
Grenoble demanded the equivalent of US$ 85 million in damages from the cabinet minister and 
former major Alain Carignon, his staff and Jean-Jaques Prompsey, executive of Lyonnaise des 
Eaux. After the trial on corruption charges, both Alain Carignon and Jean-Jaques Prompsey re-
ceived prison sentences for respectively accepting and giving bribes to award the water contract 
to a subsidiary of Lyonnaise des Eaux42. Consequently, the new administration decided to re-
gain ownership of the operation of water, also in the light of the three-fold rise of prices suffered 
by local consumers in the six years since privatisation. In a different instance, convictions have 
regarded two executives of Générale des Eaux, pleaded guilty of corruptly bribing the mayor of 
St-Denis, Ile de Reunion, to attain the water concession. As stressed by the Cour de Comptes 
in its report, corruption emerges from the whole system43. Similar cases are in fact frequent in 
the water industry as well as in other public utilities, in which major TNCs were accused or con-
demned for corruption of public officials in developed, developing and transitional countries44.  
 
Policy makers’ efforts to come to a satisfactory solution to the issue do not coincide in the elab-
oration of a competition regulating set of rules, as corruption is not necessarily related to collu-
sive behaviour. In reality, the two aspects cannot be completely separated as fair competition 
and transparency in public procurement and public services provision would restrict the scope 
for abuse of corporate power. Such an approach seems to be by this time neglected, despite 
the evident connection between restricted or negotiated procedures and irregularities. Rather, 
solutions are sought by means of reduced benefits deriving from bribery in consequence of loss 
of future business opportunities and, to a lesser extent, by means of augmenting the cost of 
bribery in terms of more severe penalties. An interesting response is provided for by Article 29 
of the European Directive on Public Service contracts (EC 92/50) stating that: “Any service pro-
vider may be excluded from participation in a contract who: ..... c) has been convicted of an of-
fence concerning his professional conduct by a judgement which has the force of res judicata; 
d) has been guilty of grave professional misconduct proven by any means which the contracting 
authorities can justify .....”. National and local representatives are more and more considering 
the exclusion from participation in a public contract of enterprises involved in unprofessional 
conduct or criminal offences as a powerful deterrent to bribery (PSPRU, 1996: 21-22). Yet, this 
                                                          
42  Source: Public Services Privatisation Research Unit (PSPRU). 
43  Investigations for further possible cases of corruption continue in France, including Martin Bouygues himself 
and the chief executive of SAUR, as well as further investigations of Générale des Eaux over alleged bribes in 
Normandy and Lyonnaise des Eaux, being now prosecuted by a consumers group in Bordeaux alleging brib-
ery now to win the local water contract. Source: Public Services Privatisation Research Unit (PSPRU). 
44  For full details, see PSPRU (1996: 21-27). 
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 appreciable approach risks to be limited in scope and partial in respect of the magnitude of the 
phenomenon in question. The French Cour de Comptes has in fact denounced the isolation of 
local authorities left alone to bargain with TNCs, real conglomerates of power, in a context of 
remarkable disparity (PSI, 1997). The European Community experience in matter of regulation 
of public service concessions suggests that even a consolidated international organisation at 
regional level can prove inadequate to resist immense lobbying pressures.  
 
Having said that, it is possible to anticipate that the need is perceived for a comprehensive mul-
tilateral policy, in order to restrain such a transnational organisation of anti-competitive practices 
and a global distribution of corruption by transnational conglomerates of power. However, it can 
be assumed that private operators’ misconduct is attributable to the inadequacy of national and 
international regulation in the domain considered. Re-regulation, or the reform of the existing 
regulatory frameworks, appears fundamental to the development of socially and environmentally 
sustainable strategies in the area of public utilities, with particular reference to water supply and 
sewerage 
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3. TNCs’ conduct in the water industry and the enabling  
regulatory framework 
 
As regards national regulation in the water sector, the French and the British systems are to be 
considered as those characterised by the outmost significance of private involvement. Also, the 
two frameworks are often referred to as models by foreign policy-makers, as is demonstrated by 
the reform of the Italian legislation which represents a compromise between the two systems45. 
The observation of the relative experiences can thus suggest how the liberalisation and re-
structuring of the water industry is likely to develop in other countries. It is anticipated that both 
the French and the UK frameworks are characterised by a neo-liberal approach in market regu-
lation, so that none provides for the limitation of profits while regulation is in either cases vague 
or permissive. As regards international law, there is a patent lack of influence on the conduct of 
the largest public service TNCs due to the difficulties of internationally agreed rules to address 
non state subjects as well as to the limitation in scope and ideological inspiration of the existing 
legal instruments. At both national and supranational levels, a momentous redefinition of rules 
and policies is necessary in order to manage trade in the global water industry.  
 
3.1.  The domestic regulatory framework: the French model  
system 
 
Broadly regarded as a model for foreign legislators, the French system allows private participa-
tion by means of local competitive bidding although retaining significant control on tariffs and 
standards in the hands of public authorities, such as municipalities or regional agencies. On the 
one hand, successful companies or entities are granted local monopoly on a long term basis of 
usually thirty years, calculated so as to permit full cost recovery. On the other hand, public au-
thorities play a remarkable role in the overall process, in that they are in some cases responsi-
ble also for constructing and operating the needed infrastructure such as pipelines and sanita-
tion plants (Roth, 1987: 251-256).  The French regulatory system thus owes its popularity 
among policy-makers to the mix of public and private involvement in managing water utilities, 
deemed to result in an appreciable balance between potentially contrasting interests. Neverthe-
less, the political will has proved insufficient or reluctant to control the private conduct in the 
public good and therefore to ensure the well functioning of the model system. It can be further 
                                                          
45  The reform of the Italian water sector regulation was enacted in 1994 (act of 5 January 1994, n° 36; so called 
“Legge Galli), but it has not been implemented yet. 
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 assumed that the acknowledged deficiencies in the overall system are due to its peculiar insti-
tutional features and to the ensuing democratic deficit in the regulation of utility operators.   
 
The French model system is currently based on the two Water Acts of 1964 and 1992, respec-
tively fixing quality and pollution control objectives as well as adapting national legislation to EC 
Directives (Serageldin, 1995: 19)46. At central level, the prevailing principle is that of interminis-
terial coordination. There is not a single authority holding responsibility for the water sector and 
each ministry intervenes in the light of its specific competence, although the Environment minis-
try has the relevant role of coordinating all central administrative bodies. In order to attain an in-
tegrated “river basin management”, regional agencies also known as Water Boards contribute to 
investment, R&D and information, in line with the deliberations of Basin Committees (Nicolazo, 
1997: 77-80). It should be noted that Water Boards devote consistent shares of the sustained 
expenditures to research and development, averaging 14 percent of budgets approved in the 
period from 1992 to 199647, while in 1996 they were allotted 17 percent of the collected tariffs48. 
However, as in other services, municipalities have full responsibility for the organisation and 
management of water provision and, for this purpose, can opt between the public management 
and the delegation of water utilities to the private sector (Lorraine, 1997: 210-214).  
 
From the contractual point of view, employment of water suppliers in the French model system 
occurs under the scheme of three principal arrangements, gérance, concession and affermage. 
Gérance corresponds to a management agreement according to which the private contractor 
undertakes the obligation to perform such ancillary services to the operation and maintenance 
of water and sewerage facilities as provision of technical assistance and collection of charges, 
on behalf of the public authority (Roth, 1987: 251-256)49. Both the concession and affermage 
agreements provide for the obligation of the contractor, respectively the concessionnaire and 
the fermier, to operate local utilities à ses risques et périls, whilst the municipality retains full 
ownership of the existing infrastructure and the works performed in the life of the contract. The 
difference lies in that, under concession, the financing of the required investment is the duty of 
the concessionnaire while, under affermage, such onus is on municipalities (Rossi, 1997: 
162-164; Roth, 1987: 251-256). In practice, affermage is the prevailing arrangement, although a 
                                                          
46  The two Water Acts are respectively of 16th December 1964 and 3rd January 1992. 
47  Serageldin, 1995: 19. 
48  Nguyen (1997: 81-84). As for the remaining share, 43 percent was paid to distribution, 35 percent to sewer-
age, 55 percent as VAT and 1 percent to the National Fund for the Provision of Drinking Water.  
49  In the proper conception, gérance implies the contracting out of the whole operation and can also compre-
hend elements of profit-sharing between the employer and the contractor (Roth, 1987: 251-256).  
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whole range of arrangements assembling different elements of the traditional classifications has 
been developed by usage50.  
 
The success of the French model system is emphasised by the adoption of affermage in Central 
and Eastern Europe, with 12 cases of water utilities privatisation in Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic 51. In developing countries, on the other hand, concessions in the form of 
BOT(Build, Operate and Transfer) or similar agreements are in effect more frequent52. This oc-
curs as such sophisticated forms of project financing, despite the usual lack of public finance, 
allow the contractors to mobilise the required amounts of capital from credit institutions53. How-
ever, as in France, there are variations on the basis of the extent left for public ownership of the 
water systems. A good example is the recent privatisation of the Manila Metropolitan Water 
Sewage System (MWSS). In that case, after splitting the metropolitan territory in two areas, the 
national government decided to delegate the operation of the utilities to two private consortia for 
a period of 25 years, while retaining full ownership of MWSS assets (UNCTAD, 1997: 186-187). 
 
3.1.1.  Supposed strengths and manifest weaknesses of the French model 
system  
 
In order to assess the functioning of the French model system, it must be observed that despite 
such a complex network of competences and delegated responsibilities there is no national reg-
ulator to assist local authorities or monitor their conduct, as the case might be. In this respect, 
there is a broad consensus of opinion that the French system would induce domestic firms to 
abstain from monopolistic and unfair practices, notwithstanding the entrenched oligopoly market 
structure at national level. The above conviction is generally supported by three arguments: the 
purportedly contained 6 percent profits of the two major domestic water companies, as com-
pared to the average 10 percent of the 10 privatised British water authorities; the high degree of 
competition and the dynamism of corporate growth strategies; the satisfactory level of tariffs and 
the irrelevance of customers’ complaints. The oligopoly market structure, combined with the ter-
ritorial fragmentation of operations and the ensuing atomic structure of local authorities respon-
sible for ensuring water provision, would entail a diffuse, though indirect, regulation at both 
                                                          
50  Source: Public Services Privatisation Research Unit (PSPRU).  
51 See table 4. Privatised water concessions in CEE, as of May 1997, page 28 
52  Source: Public Services Privatisation Research Unit (PSPRU). 
53  On BOT/BOO agreements, see note 8. It is then important to note that the magnitude of the works in question 
induces the concessionaire, a single private entity, to regularly resort to subcontracting, enlarging the number 
of subjects involved.    
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 economic and political level (Lorraine, 1997: 210-214). In this sense, regulation would not de-
rive from an apposite authority acting as regulator but from customers themselves through the 
political control of the mayor in charge and, in particular, through the deterrent of contrary voting 
at next elections. This sort of benchmark or yardstick competition mechanism would originate 
from the comparison of the tariffs and the quality of service provided in the bordering municipali-
ties and that of domicile as well as from the indirect judgement of the mayor’s choice in the del-
egation of utilities. The French system would hence conciliate corporate efficiency and the in-
terest of local communities of customers, due to the enduring endeavours of the competing op-
erators to protect their reputation in front of the mayors of the whole nation, which is the relevant 
market. In reality, in the absence of a strong, central competent authority, the effectivness of 
such a vague regulatory framework could only be granted occasionally. 
 
As a matter of fact, in its January 1997 report on the French water industry, the Cour des 
Comptes, France’s national audit body, has denounced the adverse effects produced on the 
public by the lack of control and transparency in operations added to excessive pricing. Firstly, 
competition seems to be organised rather than open, with frequent concerted and other restric-
tive practices. Although consistent with EU legislation, systematic resort by local authorities to 
negotiated procedures with a restricted number of undertakings, thus eluding the evaluation of 
tenders according to published, objective and non-discriminatory criteria, is far from being sat-
isfactory as competition and transparency are concerned (PSPRU, 1997; Kerf, 1995). So that 
the oligopoly structure of the domestic and international market continue by this time to be pre-
served. The aggressive behaviour abroad of French-based TNCs is in fact attributable to the 
quasi-monopoly at home. In addition, it is true that control by water boards at regional level is 
not as severe as should be required. Local authorities are responsible for the yearly approval of 
prices proposed by private operators but, as it occurs under the UK legal framework54, profits 
are not subject to regulation. Which encourages companies to compress costs so as to maxim-
ise profits for a given price, despite the unavoidable sacrifice of the service quality and of the 
safety of consumers.  
 
Second, profit margins appear to be more substantial than admitted due to the excessive dura-
tion of contracts, sometimes exceeding 30 years, not seldom associated with the extension of 
                                                          
54  The UK system is run under statute by a regulator appointed by, and given terms of reference by, the  gov-
ernment. The UK regulator's remit emphasises that he must ensure that the companies are financially profita-
ble enough to be safe from bankruptcy, and he has certainly achieved this object. Within these terms of ref-
erence, he sets down limits on price levels - not profits - which take account of investment plans etc. Source: 
Public Services Privatisation Research Unit (PSPRU).  
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contracts without the submission to tendering procedures. The deriving profit margins for in-
cumbent undertakings are therefore the result of a substantial restriction of competition. In Di-
nard, Ile-et-Vilaine, France, for instance, CISE was awarded the right to run local water utilities 
in 1929 and subsequently obtained the renewal of the concession up to 2005, without having to 
face competition (PSPRU, 1997). In addition, profits would result even higher if the return from 
subcontracting to subsidiaries without competitive bidding was valued. 
 
Furthermore, since 1992, water prices have risen at an average rate of 10 percent per year, 
mostly where water has been privatised, corresponding to 75 percent of the French network. 
Finally, the Cour des Comptes rejected the companies’ argument of heavy investments requir-
ing such price rises as inconsistent in many of the cases considered. For instance, in Engleton, 
Correze, prices have doubled in three years of private management despite investments were 
utterly procured by the municipality. This is obvious as affermage is the prevailing form of pub-
lic-private partnership in France. 
 
Finally, the low quality standards imposed on consumers to augment profit margins for a given 
price represent a serious risk for the public health. A recent case involving one the two French 
“majors” is of relevance. “Générale des Eaux was successfully prosecuted in July 1994 for sup-
plying poor quality water to a community in France (at Trégeux, in Côtes d’Armor). The compa-
ny was prosecuted by local inhabitants, supported by consumer and environmental groups, for 
supplying water which was unfit for consumption due to excessive nitrates and pesticides on 
476 days between 1990 and 1993. Générale des Eaux was plead guilty although it responded 
by denying responsibility for standards” (PSPRU, 1996: 31-32). The argument was that im-
provement in water quality comes from the provision of new installations, pretended to be the 
responsibility of the municipality. The company’s duty rather consisted of operating the installa-
tions for producing and distributing water which had been delegated to it by the local administra-
tion. According to the French enterprise, if water sources get polluted the installation may not be 
able to cope and thus the responsibility of the company should be limited to informing the coun-
cil of the situation. Such a precedent spreads evidence on the need to insert performance 
clauses in the public contract, binding the private contractor to provide the service required at a 
certain quality level excepted force majeure55.  
                                                          
55  Force majeure is an accepted principle of international trade law, recognised by national legislations with var-
ious distinctions. In general, force majeure excuses one party to a contractual relationship from performance 
of an obligation, which was rendered impossible due to an unforeseen and unforeseeable, irresistible and ex-
traordinary event, falling out of the obligee’s control. In case that the performance in question is not objectively 
impossible, but the equilibrium of the contract has been fundamentally altered, as it could be for a substantial 
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 The absence of an authoritative regulator is a major deficiency in the French system, as there 
is no compensatory element to the unbalance of bargaining power, in terms of knowledge and 
resources, between local authorities and large public service TNCs. As observed yet, such un-
balance clearly favours the diffusion of corruption which occurs so frequently to deem that it is 
internalised in corporate growth strategies. Consequently, the above benchmark competition 
mechanism is likely to fail as mayors would be deprived of the function to control private opera-
tors’ conduct in the interest of customers-voters. Moreover, also in the eventuality that consum-
ers disposed of the required information to evaluate the behaviour of the local supplier, the na-
tional oligopoly market structure would impair any yardstick comparison. In fact, strict oligopoly 
itself, as it is in presence of three enterprises only, and concerted practices determine the ho-
mogenisation of the conditions and quality of the service provided within te internal market. Fi-
nally, the fact that the report of the Cour des Comptes was solicited by the harsh complaints of 
consumers and environmental associations56 suggests that a reform supplementary or com-
plementary to the institution of a national regulator would be the institution of a national body 
representative of consumers.  
 
 
3.2.  The domestic regulatory framework: the British model and 
price-cap regulation  
 
The 1997 report of the French Cour des Comptes provides indications which prove of interest 
for all countries where the involvement of private operators in the water sector is or is likely to 
be verified, especially the UK. Although more recently implemented, the present British system 
of water supply and sewerage is the result of a profound restructuring begun with the 1973 Wa-
ter Act (WIUC, 1985: 8-10)57 and whose outcome has been the privatisation of the 10 English 
and Welsh regional water authorities in 1989. The regional coverage of the undertakings allows 
them to achieve critical firm dimensions and the ensuing economies of scale, which explains the 
higher profits in respect of other markets only in part. Among the various privatisation pro-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
increase in the price of providing a service in the agreed terms and conditions, an other principle of modern 
international lex mercatoria, hardship, appears more appropriate. Rather than objective impossibility, hardship 
therefore implies the economic impossibility of performance. When hardship arises the obligee is entitled to 
request the re-negotiation of the contract so as to reflect the changed circumstances, rather than to terminate 
the contract as in force majeure. On force majeure, see Draetta (1996).       
56 Source: Public Services Privatisation Research Unit (PSPRU). 
57 Following the 1973 Water Act, the new water authorities, publicly owned until 1989, took over the responsibili-
ties of 157 water undertakings, 29 river authorities and 1393 sewage disposal authorities. 
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grammes implemented in the UK, that of water provision is by far the most unpopular in conse-
quence of the astonishingly marked price increases (Newbery, 1998). Particularly in the water 
industry, the ideological approach of the British government in the conduction of privatisation 
has been by no means irrelevant. The UK experience of market testing has, for instance, pro-
duced a concentration comparable to that of France. The three French water TNCs have been 
adjudicated 50 percent of the concessions awarded, while only two private contractors con-
cluded more than 100 contracts in New Hampshire. This was due to the extreme recourse to 
negotiated procedures, as encouraged by the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) excluding all bids 
from the public sector58. As regards the excessive duration of contracts, despite the fact that 
concessions in the UK commonly last 25 years, the PFI has introduced the practice of long-term 
extensions without sufficient measures ensuring post-entry competition (PSPRU, 1997).  
 
From the institutional point of view, the UK regulatory system is run under statute by the Ofwat, 
namely the national regulator, appointed by and given terms of reference by the government. 
Provided that there are no limitations to profits by water utilities, the responsibility of the regula-
tor is to ensure the financial viability of the operating companies, by fixing limits on price levels 
on the base of the investment plans developed by the regulated firms59. In theory, the ad-
vantages of the so-called price-cap regulation are given by that: the attention of the regulator is 
concentrated on the amount to be paid by consumers, allowing to obtain all the relevant infor-
mation on the operations; limits on prices are directly related to the quality and objectives of the 
service provided; the efficiency of the operator is enhanced, as companies can benefit from cost 
reductions for the planned levels of service (Caselli and Peruzzi, 1998: 14-15). In reality, price 
cap regulation seems to tolerate monopolistic behaviour rather than stimulate productivity and 
improvement in the service, as demonstrated by several examples. 
 
As a matter of fact, being based on the agreed projections of the required investment on a 
5-year period, such a price based regulation leaves substantial extra-profits in the hands of the 
companies. This was patent when Ofwat agreed with North West Water and Thames Water on 
price increases due to a forecast of UK£ 500 million investments necessary to raise capital effi-
ciency. In the relevant period, the two operators only invested UK£ 400 million so to achieve a 
net gain of UK£ 100 million. In 1995, prices imposed by South Water to the inhabitants of the 
Isle of Wight were augmented to permit the construction of 12 new plants whose works had not 
even started by the agreed date of accomplishment60. There is evidence that the price cap 
                                                          
58  Source: Public Services Privatisation Research Unit (PSPRU). See also PSPRU (1996: 16-20). 
59 Source: Public Services Privatisation Research Unit (PSPRU). 
60  Source: Public Services Privatisation Research Unit (PSPRU). 
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 mechanism of price increases reflecting uncertain investments on behalf of the contractor is an 
incentive to underinvestment rather than ameliorated service quality. Moreover, such situation 
can be described as typical moral hazard, in that the absence of profit cap implies that no effec-
tive penalties are imposable on non compliant operators. The only sanction provided for by stat-
ute is the price-cap reduction for the subsequent period, which does not preclude the extra prof-
its obtained61. Rather than a sanction against companies, the price-cap reduction appears as an 
undue penalty for consumers as it further discourages immoral operators from making the nec-
essary investment.  
 
Similarly, many cases in the UK experience highlight the argument of stricter quality require-
ments in water supply. The above statement holds particularly true in cases where the profitabil-
ity of the business was the only concern of the contractors, despite the legitimate interest of lo-
cal communities in receiving minimum quality services. Water companies in the British market 
“have been extremely successful at making profits, paying dividends to shareholders and fees 
to directors”. Conversely, “the year 1995 highlighted how the companies’ financial objectives are 
indifferent to, or conflict with, technical standards of service. Virtually all the water companies 
found themselves unable to cope with two months of drought. Hose-pipe bans, standpipes and 
cut-offs were widespread, but profits and dividends continued to rise” (PSPRU, 1996: 32). As far 
as pollution of rivers and drinking water is concerned, the most recent major case in the UK was 
in 1997 when Three Valleys Water, a subsidiary to Générale des Eaux, allowed their water to be 
contaminated with a bacterium which made it poisonous and unfit to drink62. 
 
One more deficiency in the UK regulatory framework is that, once an acquisition takes place, 
the Ofwat does not dispose of instruments to separate the respective accounts of the parent 
company and its subsidiary. The ensuing fluid accounting boundaries cause major difficulties in 
assessing the soundness of the proposed price increases, especially when subcontracting is 
directly allotted to vertically integrated subsidiaries without competitive tendering. The cost of 
works and operations performed in the vertical integration chain of water provision, which is to 
say not directly related to water supply and sewerage, tend in fact to be loaded into water prices 
so to induce undue augmentation. In such cases, the regulator is constrained by the suffered 
asymmetry of information, as it is extremely difficult to ascertain where a company begins and 
ends63.  
 
                                                          
61  Source: Public Services Privatisation Research Unit (PSPRU). 
62  Source: Public Services Privatisation Research Unit (PSPRU). 
63  Source: Public Services Privatisation Research Unit (PSPRU). 
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The UK experience suggests that the presence of a national regulator is not sufficient by itself to 
provide adequate regulation. In particular, price-cap or price-based regulation manifestly allows 
significant opportunities for private operators to impose their monopolistic behaviour to consum-
ers. An alternative approach shifting the regulator’s attention from the proposed projections on 
the investment required to the successive assessment of corporate conduct and providing for 
effectual deterrent sanctions would hence be preferable. Having said that, it should be noted 
that the same distorsions present in the French system are acknowledged in the UK system, i.e. 
excessive pricing and profits added to low quality service, not to mention inadequate control of 
and transparency in operations, despite the different attitude towards market regulation. Ac-
cordingly, it can be inferred that no appreciable answer can be provided by national legislations 
only. This also demonstrates that more flexible mechanisms than neo-liberal policies are to im-
plement in regulating water provision, so as to responsively encounter the basic needs of local 
communities. 
 
3.3.  International regulation of TNCs’ conduct and  
anti-competitive practices 
 
Current international instruments directly addressing TNCs and their conduct include the OECD 
Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, of 21 June 1976, and the 
United Nations Draft Code of Conduct of Transnational Corporations, not yet adopted in its final 
version. While the Declaration relates to the member governments of OECD, a regional organi-
sation whose action is inspired by pro-market considerations64, the Code would address all 
member governments of the United Nations at universal level. The heterogeneous composition 
of UN membership and the ensuing conflicting interests between capital exporting and capital 
importing countries explain the long and difficult elaboration of the Code of Conduct since its in-
clusion in the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) agenda in 
197765. Both legal instruments contain general provisions in the form of Guidelines or recom-
mendations on competition and abstention from corrupt practices for the recipient governments 
to observe in regulating TNCs (Di Blase, 1996a; 1996b). In consequence of their “soft law” na-
                                                          
64  See above note 11. 
65  Among the vast literature on the subject, see Tschofen (1992), Migliorino (1989: 14 ff.) and Treves (1987). 
Once adopted, the UN Code of Conduct would be comparable, for the effect of its provisions, to the Declara-
tions of Principles of the UN General Assembly. Such Declarations are in general not mandatory while pre-
serving the lawfulness of actions taken by recipient member countries in accordance to the expressed rec-
ommendations.    
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 ture, in fact, the rules set by the OECD Declaration and the UN Draft Code of Conduct respec-
tively are not and would not be binding for the governments in question nor for the corporations 
concerned.  
 
All the limitations of international law, not directly applicable to enterprises which are not inter-
national subjects, arise in this context and the political interests of industrialised countries to 
protect domestic firms and capitals have certainly influenced the attitude of the international 
community. Interestingly, however, an international organisation constituted in a homogeneous 
region as Western Europe, namely the European Union (EU), is empowered to directly submit 
individuals and undertakings to the rule of EU anti-trust policy. The EU has also proved particu-
larly active in promoting co-operation agreements on competition issues with its major trading 
partners, as other European countries than the current 15 EU member states and the US, while 
less formal steps have been taken towards a number of countries in different regions. The fact 
that co-ordination of competition policies is enhanced by economic integration shows the possi-
ble developments of parallel efforts displayed by international economic institutions as the 
OECD to enable the convergence of competition policies. It is likely that an international compe-
tition forum will be provided by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), whether on the form of an 
authority entitled to enforce the rules set in an international code or whether on the form of a 
panel mechanism (Lesguillons, 1995)66.  
 
However, it is largely disputable that a general international competition regime designed to 
foster the free circulation of goods and services could be extended to such a crucial and peculi-
ar field as the public utilities sector. Indeed, a differentiated approach should be adopted to pro-
tect the largest public interests in obtaining essential services as water supply and sanitation, 
which would be inevitably dismissed by the prevailing neo-liberal approach. Anti-competitive 
practices and diversion of welfare from the public accompanying liberalisation and deregulation 
of public utilities world-wide are in fact to be tempered in a pragmatic and flexible rather than 
ideological approach. The preferable solution seems to be found in the correct balance between 
public and private involvement in the operation of utilities, which could guarantee the satisfac-
tion of the broadest needs and a more efficient use of the available economic resources at the 
same time. Thus, SOEs and public enterprises in general should not be penalised by a homo-
geneous set of rules, but treated in light of their differentiated role. Increasing demand for inter-
                                                          
66  A recent development in the mentioned direction has taken place under the initiative of the European Trade 
Commissioner, addressing the WTO to explore all possibilities of an international agreement on competi-
tion-related issues and of enhanced co-operation between national competition authorities. See UNCTAD 
(1997: 76-81).     
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national devices regulating practices restrictive of competition and corporate misconduct in the 
context of globalisation is a signal of how a competition regime in the water industry and other 
public utilities is not an unrealistic objective. However, the provisions of a universal legal 
framework have to adequately reflect developing countries’ expectations of a “development 
friendly” competition policy. Developing countries not only happen to be concerned with limiting 
large TNCs’ abuses of market power but also with favouring “level playing fields” for domestic 
firms whose consolidation would in most cases be conditioned by an aggressive foreign compe-
tition (South Centre, 1997: 76-81)67. Frustrating such requests would conflict with the moral im-
perative of managing global trade in a way conducive to economic and social development. 
Moreover, it would hinder the prospective adoption of an effective multilateral competition policy, 
which would be geographically restricted to a club of industrialised countries or would result lim-
ited in scope and normative clarity.   
 
3.4.  The WTO and GATT agreements following the Uruguay 
Round 
 
After the replacement by WTO of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as an in-
stitutional seat for the negotiation and implementation of trade related measures, significant 
changes have been introduced affecting the management of global trade. Existing international 
rules applicable to public services and utilities are now available within the WTO framework, 
with particular reference to the agreements adopted after the Uruguay Round with the Marra-
kesh Declaration of 15 April 1994. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) ap-
plies to a wide range of services, from telecommunications to transport, tourism as well as fi-
nancial and professional services (Beviglia Zampetti, 1996: 24-26), with the clear exclusion of 
water provision. In fact, Article I.3b) states that GATS applies to measures affecting trade in 
services “in any sector except services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority”, in-
tended as “any service which is supplied neither on a commercial basis, nor in competition with 
one or more service suppliers”68. As we have seen, the natural monopoly structure of market in 
water supply and sewerage is given by concessions being awarded locally, which thus denies 
the applicability of GATS rules but is not sufficient to elude the question of competition.  
                                                          
67  The “level playing fields” issue is similar to that of permitting limitations to the principle of national treatment in 
the context of a Possible Multilateral Framework on Investment (PMFI) alternative to the proposed OECD 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). Both aim at adapting the ongoing liberalisation of global trade 
and investment to unmet developmental objectives. See South Centre (1997: 4-7).   
68  Article I.3c) GATS. 
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The issue is dealt with by Article XIII.2 requiring “multilateral negotiations on government pro-
curement in services under this Agreement within two years from the date of entry into force of 
the WTO Agreement”. Such negotiations have given rise to a contradictory result, represented 
by the Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP) superseding and extending the coverage 
of the former Tokyo Round Agreement (Reich, 1997). The AGP covers procurement in public 
utilities as water, energy and transport, but does not encompass telecommunications for the dif-
ficulties of the negotiating parties in reaching consensus. The aim of the AGP is to enhance the 
opening up of procurement in public utilities to international competition and it thus provides for 
mandatory bid challenge procedures, allowing aggrieved suppliers to challenge alleged infring-
ments of the Agreement before a court or an independent judicial body. If recognised ground to 
the complaint, the tribunal is empowered to correct the breach by re-establishing the situation 
preceding the tender. This will eventually imply the termination of the contract whose conces-
sion has been proven irregular according to the AGP rules. This is an innovative feature of AGP 
as compared to EC law, which does not provides for such a deterrent (Reich, 1997; Kerf, 1995). 
In alternative to the annulment of the contract concluded in wrong, the plaintiff will be awarded 
compensation in the form of damages.  
 
However, potential restrictions to the powers of the court to intervene in the post-award or 
post-entry phase suggest that the only regulation of tendering procedures is insufficient to ex-
clude the systematic violation of antitrust rules. Such powers should in fact be strengthened and 
enlarged in the perspective of an international body responsible for the restraint of practices re-
strictive of competition as well as of other forms of corporate misconduct. Moreover, the AGP 
seems extremely limited in its geographical scope, as the signatory countries are only 23 in-
cluding the 15 EU member states, Canada, South Korea, Aruba, Japan, Israel, Norway, the US 
and Switzerland. Accession of non signatory countries to the AGP will be submitted to the ap-
proval of a Committee representing all parties on the basis of the business opportunities offered 
by the candidate (Kerf, 1997). This impairs a possible extension of the Agreement to a large 
number of developing countries, as the Committee will decide in the light of the economic inter-
ests of developed and newly industrialised members.  
 
Furthermore, the overall content of the Agreement seems to follow too closely the neo-liberal 
pattern, without recognising a specific role for public enterprises which might participate to a bid. 
Although European legislation recognises the principle of non discrimination among bidding en-
tities on grounds of ownership, the UK government has deliberately excluded in-house bids in 
the water sector through compulsory competitive tendering and as an accomplishment of its 
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Private Finance Initiative (PSPRU, 1996: 16-20). The same might occur under the AGP, re-
gardless of the requirement of “non-discriminatory, timely, transparent and effective” tendering 
procedures. Under the liberalising pressure of the most influential states, TNCs could therefore 
take advantage of tenders regulated by the AGP to impose once again their market power. 
Such risk calls for the introduction of specific rules on competition in public utilities as well as 
more effective enforcement devices, going beyond the mere procedural phase. The AGP is not 
eligible to regulate the fairness and transparency of the global market in the water sector also 
because it does not take a crucial issue as product and production standards in sufficient ac-
count. Limited as it is to define the conditions for launching bidding procedures, it requires that 
international product and production standards be complied with, when existing, preoccupied 
that national standards could be a source of discrimination towards foreign suppliers (Reich, 
1997). It is true that such a concern is justified, but no mechanism for preventing attempts of 
TNCs to “capture” the international regulator, namely the International Standards Organisation 
(ISO) defining standards to be adopted by WTO, are considered.  
 
3.5.  Regulating standards in the global water industry 
 
Under the threat of passively witnessing the re-regulation of monopolies and cartels at global 
level, water TNCs may in fact effort to influence the decisions of bodies setting international 
standards in the same way as they exert such pressures on governmental and local authorities. 
In this last respect, a dangerous trend encouraged by cuts in public budgets leads to the pro-
gressive deregulation of consumers’ safety and environmental protection as well as to the con-
tracting out of monitoring programmes. The dismantling of governmental or administrative as-
sessment bodies is usually accompanied by the elimination of existing regulation and the re-
placement of former rules with non compulsory codes of good practices, as well as by the pri-
vatisation of monitoring operations (National Union, 1997). In the absence of specific impedi-
ments to the acquisition of ownership of or control on the private actors to which the responsibil-
ity for assessing the social and environmental soundness of corporate behaviour is delegated, 
the need is perceived for redundantly regulating the regulator. Moreover, it is without saying that 
such an open way to corporate “ voluntary compliance ” and “ self-reliance ” certainly boosts the 
growth of firms as a consequence of the abatement of production costs, to the direct detriment 
of the quality of life of local communities. Such issues reactivate the debate on the role of official 
standard bodies and on the desirability of standards setting by official authority or market forces 
(Grindley, 1995: 1-3), but most of all urge for discussing the role of standards in enhancing 
market concentration and affecting public safety. 
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 Success of water TNCs in “capturing” the international regulator would result in the power of 
such free-riders to enjoy self-imposition of product and production standards. This is a threat to 
prevent long before it could be realised, as “self-defined” standards are potential vehicles of 
furthered rather than restrained concentration. They could increase vertical integration through 
setting barriers to potential competitors in auctions for the provision of required facilities, sanita-
tion plants and pipelines. In such case, the definition of too high standards could represent a re-
striction to entry of new operators, especially if originating from developing countries. 
“Self-imposed” standards would also foster horizontal integration in that the monopoly holder 
would be in a position to control the service quality in order to maximise the profitability of the 
venture. In a monopolistic situation, higher profits are expected to be distributed to shareholders 
as dividends or reinvested in the horizontal expansion of the holding’s business. The risk in 
question is therefore that of a consequent irreversibility of the oligopoly structure of the water 
industry at global level. Moreover, the quality of water and the consequent health of consumers 
tend to be affected by low product standards, not to mention the damages that water operators 
could cause in the absence of appropriate environmental standards. In this respect, responsibil-
ity for controls on environmental safety cannot be substantially delegated to the private sector 
which, if not compelled, will tend to compress costs related to avoid pollution in the production 
chain. As previously observed, several cases in the global water industry indicate the magnitude 
of the standards issue. 
 
Once acknowledged the potential effects of the “self-definition” of standards by TNCs, measures 
devoted at avoiding the “capture” of the international regulator become necessary. It is now 
clear that corporate influence on the body empowered to establish standards for water would 
result in the self-regulation of such conglomerates of power, thus enhancing concentration, 
monopolistic behaviour, corruption and bribery. Such an outcome could be facilitated by the in-
accessible content of technical standards, which elude the general comprehension and hence 
discourage an active interest in the masses. Sophisticated debates on appropriate technical 
standards tend in fact to exclude the participation of the public, lacking sufficient knowledge. 
This is emphasised by the degree of unaccountability in international economic institutions as 
WTO, depending on the will of member governments but not directly responsible to citizens af-
fected by its decisions. Finally, there is evidence of the need to comprehend the standards issue 
in a future international competition policy designed in order to provide solutions to existing or 
possible impediments to manage global trade in public services. In addition, the reform of the 
organisational structure of the international bodies delegated to investigate alleged violations of 
standards regulation, as well as related restrictions to competition and damages to the public 
interest, should also be addressed. The proposed reform should lead to a more democratic de-
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cision-making process, thanks to the participation of representatives of all the categories con-
cerned: employers, contractors and consumers, the ultimate recipient of public services and util-
ities. A tri- or multi-partite structure, modelled on the pattern of the International Labour Organi-
sation, would not only allow transparency in the marketplace but also in the adoption of resolu-
tions falling within the scope of the broadest public interests.  
 
4. Designing alternative policies in the global water industry 
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 4. Designing alternative policies in the global water industry: 
towards a sustainable transnational re-regulation of  
monopolies?  
 
The absence of a comprehensive international policy to manage transnational trade in strategic 
public services and utilities, such as water supply and sewerage, is to consider as a lost oppor-
tunity. It is patent that, especially under the prevailing neo-liberal approach, local and national 
authorities do not dispose of the necessary power to guide the process of globalisation in es-
sential public utilities towards sustainable development and the promotion of public and com-
mon interests. In the trade-off between commercial considerations and social and environmental 
purposes, the latter should be regarded as the veritable raison d’être of public utilities provision. 
Accordingly, the redefinition of policies to implement in the area in question is an objective to 
pursue in order to ensure continuous, equal and universal access to these services.  
 
Having said that, the re-regulation of public utilities at national level is a necessary though insuf-
ficient precondition to the design and implementation of innovative, alternative policies to the 
distortive neo-liberal dogma of full pricing at cost. At a first stage, such re-regulation might be 
envisaged as a contribution to the diffusion of international consensus, while in a second phase 
the developed international framework might provide a solution to those countries experiencing 
difficulties in the reform of their institutional structure. Generally, alternative policies should aim 
to a redefinition of the role of public enterprises and of the instituional environment in which they 
operate and compete. 
 
4.1.  Alternative policies strengthening the role of public  
enterprises 
 
There is evidence that, contrary to common belief, publicly owned enterprises appear no less 
efficient than privatised companies on costs, personnel ratios, technical performance and finan-
cial comparisons (Hall, 1998b: 127-129). This is not only attributable to the corporatisation and 
management commercialisation of modern “independent” public enterprises, as inefficiencies of 
private operators are also acknowledged especially as far as costs and technical performance 
are concerned. Also from the financial point of view, state guarantees on income and profitability 
commonly requested by private corporations undermine the concept of entrepreneurial risk, 
corresponding to the public subsidisation of private operation of utilities and thus to an undue 
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transfer of public funds to private profits69. Moreover, public water enterprises show a stronger 
attitude towards socially oriented performance as is the case of the German system, with a re-
markable commitment to maximise environmental quality (Hall, 1998b: 127-129). Stemming 
from the ability of publicly run water operators to conciliate commercial considerations, efficien-
cy gains and public objectives, their role in the provision of water should be promoted within an 
appropriate regulatory framework, protecting consumers from the risks of the “cream skimming” 
effect, among which the homogeneous conduct of private and public operators. In such a way to 
encourage corporate performance according to sound practices, “benchmark” or “yard-stick” 
public-private competition should be envisaged on the base of the financial viability and eco-
nomic efficiency, as well as of supplementary indicators as the hygienic-sanitary, social and en-
vironmental impact determined. In other words, such comparison would allow to maximise the 
virtuous conduct of competitors. 
 
More generally, it is advisable that public enterprises be recognised equal access to tendering 
procedures, without being denied participation because of their non-private ownership. Prejudi-
cial exclusion of bids from the public sector corresponds to the introduction of more significant 
market distortions than those intended to elude. Not allowing in-house bids, the market domi-
nance of TNCs is in fact enlarged contributing to the consolidation of excessive corporate pow-
er. Conversely, in-house bids could restrain contradictory results of the mentioned mechanisms 
when only private entities participate to the auction. What usually happens is that the territory for 
which the concession is awarded is split in at least two areas, with the allowed consortia bidding 
for both or all districts although not entitled to win the concession for more than one.  
 
In the Manila MWSS case, the concession for the Eastern area was won by Ayala, including 
Bechtel of the US and United Utilities of the UK, with a bid of 26 percent the current water rates. 
The Western area of the city was won by Benpres, including Lyonnaise des Eaux, with an offer 
of 56 percent despite the bid of the other concessionaire was 28 percent. In order to discourage 
collusion, the subcontracting of the losing consortia by the concessionaires was forbidden by 
the bidding rules (UNCTAD, 1997: 186-187). Yet, such an appreciable measure appears insuffi-
cient to exclude all attempts of concerted restrictive practices, which would be further restrained 
by a public offer. In-house bids could also decrease the number of cases where, as in Manila, 
bordering communities receive such a differentiated treatment from the incumbent operators. It 
is true that the Philippine governmental agency previously operating the MWSS utilities was not 
in a position to participate to the auction, but even in similar events the public offer could serve 
                                                          
69  Source: Public Services Privatisation Research Unit (PSPRU). For the equivalent practice of revenues guar-
antees outside France, see PSPRU (1996: 40-41). 
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 to assess the soundness of the private tenders. Not to mention that information on costs col-
lected to estimate future tariff rises would be more complete.  
 
When a single public enterprise is not endowed with the necessary financial and technical 
means to run the plants, the participation to the bidding procedure of transnational public con-
sortia, including national and foreign public enterprises, beside that of transnational private 
consortia could be alternatively envisaged. The lesson of corporatisation and management 
commercialisation contributing to the efficiency gains registered by public enterprises should 
thus be transferred also to the domain of critical firm dimensions and economies of scale, so to 
augment the range of action of socially and environmentally oriented operators. It is clear that 
this would require the abolition of all the existing territorial restrictions to the trading initiatives of 
public enterprises. 
 
As transitory measures, the public interest to a proper operation of water utilities has to be pro-
tected by subjecting the public or private monopoly holder to provisions deterring abuses and 
unfair conduct as well as to some degree of competition. First, incumbent undertakings whose 
concession was granted in wrong should lose the acquired rights in favour of the excluded bid-
ders once the alleged violations were proven. Bid challenge procedures allowing the competent 
tribunal to restore excluded bidders from the suffered wrong should hence be introduced to the 
largest extent possible. As far as post-entry competition is concerned, the French Cour des 
Comptes has suggested that 30 year concessions should be considerably reduced and the re-
newal of exclusive rights of operation should not be automatic. Similarly, the performance of 
monopolists should be periodically reviewed in order to assess whether market power has been 
abused as well as whether the agreed performance criteria have been respected and the per-
formance objectives have been met. In case of unsatisfactory findings, the concession could be 
assigned through re-bidding or other adequate measures could be taken (UNCTAD, 1997: 
185-189). 
 
4.2.  Towards an innovative international competition policy? 
 
The above general proposals cannot be directly extended at universal level and their compatibil-
ity with the critical situation of the less advanced countries has to be carefully estimated. Most 
developing countries do not dispose of satisfactory sets of competition rules70 and technical as-
                                                          
70  At present, only more than 70 countries worldwide have adopted competition laws, among which less than 40 
are developing countries. Source: UNCTAD (1997: 189). 
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sistance provided to fill this gap has to avoid legal transplants from the most advanced eco-
nomic systems, which would hardly be apt to promote development (South Centre, 1997: 
76-81). The absence of a domestic regulation of competition in the majority of developing coun-
tries does augment rather than preclude the desirability of both an international competition au-
thority and an international competition law.  
 
There is evidence that abuses of market power and misconduct of corporations performing 
globally would otherwise be far more difficult to restrain without a multilateral discipline providing 
appropriate legal and administrative instruments71. A special regime for developing and least 
developed countries is indeed required to enable domestic participation, whether public, private 
or both, to the provision of basic services to local communities. So as to allow new operators to 
emerge in non industrialised economies, national governments should be entitled to adopt 
compatible restrictions to competition, irrespective of the national treatment principle, preferably 
in the form of flexible incentives to domestic entities for a limited duration. Similar and other 
measures are to be included in an overall strategy to prevent the disadvantages susceptible to 
derive from “infant industry” policies while attaining the positive outcomes potentially arising 
from the protection of greenfield sectors of the national economy. The experience of countries 
as Japan and the Four Tigers has evidenced that restrictions to competition aimed at protecting 
“infant industries” can, if properly managed as a complement to domestic industrial policies, be 
conducive to development (Hogendorn, 1990: 70-78).  
 
This calls for allowing a certain degree of discretion to national competition authorities of devel-
oping countries, so that the implementation of both domestic and international competition poli-
cies can be entirely functional to the achievement of developmental objectives. By contrast, the 
industrialised group, mainly consisting of OECD member countries, favours the elaboration of a 
neo-liberal international competition regime with general provisions applicable to all parties ir-
respective of their economic and social conditions. Had this idea to prevail, the WTO/GATT 
pattern of rules fostering trade liberalisation world-wide, with developing countries being only 
allowed to adapt national legislations in a longer period, would be applied to competition (South 
Centre, 1997: 76-81). In such a scenario, the signatories to an agreement on competi-
                                                          
71  The problem exists, although to a different extent, for the most advanced systems as well. Major impediments 
to restricting anti-competitive practices of large TNCs are the difficulties of national competition authorities in 
having access to information, limited co-operation to the enforcement of national laws and differences in 
competition laws, potentially leading to conflicts between national jurisdictions. See UNCTAD (1997: 
218-220).  
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 tion-related issues would presumably coincide to the AGP parties with a serious prejudice of 
the global scope of the prospective transnational framework. In view of the economic interests 
involved, it is foreseeable that the excluded countries would subsequently be subject to consid-
erable pressures to accept the established discipline after negotiating the conditions of access 
but with no opportunity to discuss the merit of existing provisions, as it is going to occur under 
the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI).    
 
In order to restrain a transnational organisation of anti-competitive practices and a global distri-
bution of corruption by transnational conglomerates of power, the need is rather perceived for a 
multilateral agency responsible for monitoring the correct functioning of the world market and 
enforcing repressive measures of the most significant abuses. So that abuses can be objective-
ly evaluated and punished, the proposed multilateral agency should act within the framework of 
widely accepted and recognised international rules. In other words, in the absence of applicable 
international customary rules, this supranational body should enforce the provisions of the mul-
tilateral, universal convention establishing the agency itself. The institution of an international 
anti-trust authority acting over national agencies’ jurisdiction or co-operating with national agen-
cies represents a first best objective but its political feasibility appears questionable, due to the 
interests at stake and the will of single countries to proceed in this direction (Lesguillons, 1995). 
Whatever the chances of a concrete realisation of such a goal in the short term, it is necessary 
to identify the preferable responses to the challenges deriving from the liberalisation of public 
services, namely restrictive practices and misconduct of TNCs. Equivalent comments could 
pertain to a multilateral set of rules dealing with corruption as well as competition, more likely to 
originate from an international initiative aimed at the harmonisation of national and regional leg-
islations. Preliminary to discuss the content of the desired international legal instrument, it is ad-
visable to consider existing or foreseen regulations of related matters in the international re-
gime. 
 
Despite the uncertainty on the immediate political feasibility of the above proposals, the neces-
sity to counterbalance the democratic deficit in managing economic globalisation appears by 
this time uncontested.    
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